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Random freezes, missing sound and display glitches usually trace back to one bad driver. Find and replace yours safely.Free scan · under a minuteBefore changing cryptography for the post-quantum era, find out where it is used, what depends on it, and what the consequences of changing it would be. A cryptographic inventory gives security and technology teams that visibility; it is an input to risk assessment and migration planning, not a completed migration or a mandate to replace algorithms immediately.
What a cryptographic inventory is—and what it is not
A cryptographic inventory is a descriptive record of where and how cryptography is used across an organization’s systems, applications, services, devices, and data flows. It should capture more than algorithm names: protocols, software and vendor dependencies, owners, business criticality, protected data, and the time that data must remain confidential all affect migration decisions.
Keep three activities distinct: discovery identifies cryptographic use; risk assessment determines which uses matter most; implementation tests and deploys changes. NIST’s PQC migration FAQ, last updated June 30, 2026, frames discovery and inventory as part of a broader migration effort. An inventory helps answer where to act first, but it does not by itself determine a safe replacement.
What to include in the inventory
Record enough context to connect cryptographic use to business impact and a plausible upgrade path. NIST’s FAQ identifies algorithms, protocols, key metadata, certificates, dependent systems, and protected data as possible inventory contents. The joint CISA, NSA, and NIST fact sheet likewise emphasizes understanding systems and data, then engaging suppliers.
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- Asset and accountability: system, application, service, device or product; business function; technical and business owner; and business criticality.
- Cryptographic use: protocol or service, algorithm, certificate or key type, and lifecycle metadata. Record metadata, not secret keys or other key material.
- Dependencies: software libraries, platforms, products, suppliers, and upstream or downstream systems that rely on the cryptography.
- Protected data: data type and sensitivity, plus how long confidentiality is required. This helps identify information that could be collected now and decrypted later.
- Operating context: location, network exposure, IT or OT environment, and whether cryptography supports confidentiality, digital signatures, software updates, or another function.
- Evidence and next steps: discovery method and confidence, migration owner, known operational constraints, and supplier upgrade or migration roadmap.
Where to look beyond public-facing TLS
A scan of internet-facing web services is a useful starting signal, not an estate-wide inventory. Cryptography may be used in internal services, products, firmware, automated build systems, cloud services, and operational technology. The CISA, NSA, and NIST fact sheet, “Quantum-Readiness: Migration to Post-Quantum Cryptography” (August 17, 2023), calls for a broader view of systems and supplier dependencies.
- Networks and services: public and internal TLS, SSH, VPNs, network protocols, and service-to-service connections.
- Endpoints, servers, and applications: operating-system capabilities, application code, bundled or dynamically linked libraries, and certificate use.
- Signing and updates: code-signing, firmware-signing, update distribution, boot processes, and the systems that validate signatures.
- Development and delivery: CI/CD pipelines, build tools, dependencies, signing services, and release systems.
- Cloud and managed services: cryptographic features provided by cloud platforms and third-party services, including dependencies not visible in local scans.
- IT, OT, and products: operational environments, appliances, embedded devices, and vendor-supplied components whose cryptography may not be visible to general-purpose scanners.
A practical workflow for building the inventory
1. Set scope and name accountable owners
Bring security, IT, OT, architecture, application teams, privacy and risk, and procurement together. Define the business units, cloud services, products, systems, and datasets in scope. Give each area an owner responsible for validating findings and resolving unknowns. The joint agency fact sheet recommends forming a project team and engaging vendors as part of migration planning.
2. Discover cryptography across the estate
Use existing architecture records, asset lists, certificate records, service configurations, code and dependency analysis, and network observations to find likely cryptographic use. Cover confidentiality and digital-signature functions, including signing and update chains. Include vendor products and managed services rather than assuming a locally installed scanner can inspect them.
3. Create a central, useful record
Choose a controlled repository or tracking workbook that can link cryptographic findings to asset ownership, risk, and follow-up actions. NIST’s FAQ points to a PQC Coalition inventory workbook as a possible starting point for centralized migration tracking. Do not put secret key material in the record.
4. Reconcile findings and validate important gaps
Compare findings with asset-management, identity and access, endpoint-detection, and continuous-monitoring records. Treat scans as evidence of observed use, not proof that all use has been found. The agency fact sheet warns that tools can miss cryptography embedded in products. Ask suppliers for product and component cryptography details, and have responsible engineering teams confirm high-risk or uncertain findings.
5. Rank risk before scheduling replacement
Assess each use against the sensitivity and required secrecy lifetime of its data, the operational impact of failure, network exposure, dependency depth, operational constraints, and the supplier’s upgrade timeline. Prioritize high-impact operations and sensitive information that must remain confidential for a long time. CISA, NSA, and NIST describe the “harvest now, decrypt later” concern: an attacker may collect protected data today in hopes of decrypting it in the future. This makes long-lived confidentiality relevant even before a cryptographically relevant quantum computer exists.
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6. Turn findings into a maintained roadmap
Assign an accountable owner and next action to each prioritized finding. Track supplier responses, testing, product upgrades, dependencies, and milestones. Refresh the inventory as systems change; a one-time snapshot can become stale as services and software are added or retired.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Use discovery tools with their limits in mind
NIST’s FAQ names pqcscan for SSH/TLS server scanning, sslscan2 for SSL/TLS service and cipher-suite checks, crt.sh for certificates associated with domains or organizations, and the cyberzero PQC Edge Scanner. NIST describes the list as non-exhaustive. These examples address different discovery angles; their listing does not establish equal coverage of applications, firmware, cloud services, or embedded cryptography.
When evaluating any discovery approach, check what it can actually observe, whether it captures asset and dependency context, how findings can be exported and maintained centrally, and how it handles false positives and missed findings. Also consider integration with existing asset and risk systems, suitability for IT and OT, and the operational impact and data access its deployment requires. Use supplier documentation and engineering validation to address areas scanners cannot see.
Keep inventory, testing, and standards in perspective
NIST says it finalized its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in 2024 and encourages organizations to begin transitioning to them. NIST mathematician Dustin Moody, who leads its PQC standardization project, said, “We encourage organizations to begin their transition to these standards immediately to ensure their data remains secure in the quantum era.” See NIST’s post-quantum cryptography overview.
That encouragement is not a reason to replace algorithms blindly. NIST’s IR 8547, Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards, was published as an initial public draft on November 12, 2024; its comment period closed January 10, 2025. The cited publication page describes NIST’s expected transition from quantum-vulnerable standards to post-quantum digital-signature and key-establishment schemes. It is a draft in that publication record, not a final transition standard.
NIST’s NCCoE migration project treats cryptographic discovery and interoperability testing as distinct workstreams. Testing in a controlled, non-production environment can surface compatibility problems before a change affects live systems. NIST’s final Cybersecurity White Paper 39 on crypto agility, published December 19, 2025, defines crypto agility as adapting and replacing algorithms across protocols, applications, software, hardware, firmware, and infrastructure while preserving security and ongoing operations. For inventory work, that means capturing dependencies and upgrade paths—not just the current algorithm.
For additional migration guidance, NIST’s FAQ names The PQC Migration Handbook: Guidelines for Migrating to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Revised and Extended Second Edition (December 2024). Federal organizations should also follow applicable agency requirements; federal deadlines and program rules are not universal private-sector deadlines.
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