The Tool Desk
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What a red-team skill tree is—and is not
Red teaming is an assessment approach in which practitioners simulate adversary behavior to examine how well an organization’s defenses and response work. NIST’s CA-8 material frames red-team exercises as simulated adversary attempts governed by applicable rules of engagement and as an extension of penetration testing toward examining defensive capability and organizational security posture. The available CA-8 material is draft markup, however, so it should not be treated as definitive current policy language.
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For a practitioner or learner, the most defensible skill tree is therefore organized around the full assessment lifecycle rather than a catalog of ways to compromise systems. It covers judgment, planning, authorized testing, analysis, and communication. The sources here support that high-level structure; they do not establish an exhaustive technical curriculum, a universal sequence of exercises, or a prescribed set of tools.
How red teaming differs from related assessments
Organizations use terms such as vulnerability assessment, penetration test, and red-team exercise in different ways. The following comparison is a planning framework, not a quoted standard: agree on the objective, boundaries, level of realism, participant awareness, and deliverables for each engagement rather than relying on the label alone.
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| Assessment | Primary question | Scope and constraints | Realism and operational impact | Who knows it is underway? | Typical deliverable to define |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vulnerability assessment | What weaknesses are present in the defined assets? | Set the assets, assessment methods, and exclusions before work begins. | Usually emphasizes identifying and documenting weaknesses; potential impact still depends on the methods allowed. | Set explicitly with the system owner; awareness is not inherent in the label. | A findings record with evidence, severity rationale, and remediation priorities, as agreed for the engagement. |
| Penetration test | Can a defined weakness or attack path be demonstrated within the agreed scope? | Specify targets, permitted actions, stop conditions, and any limits on testing. | May involve validation of weaknesses; the permitted depth and operational risk must be agreed. | Set explicitly in the rules of engagement. | Documented findings and evidence, plus mitigations or retesting expectations if included in scope. |
| Red-team exercise | How does the organization’s defense perform against a simulated threat or scenario? | Define the mission, authorized environment, constraints, and rules of engagement. | Oriented toward assessing defensive capability and organizational security posture; realism must remain bounded by authorization and safety constraints. | Decide in advance which people or teams are informed and how safety oversight will work. | An account of observed defensive performance, gaps, and improvement actions, tailored to the agreed exercise. |
These distinctions describe emphasis, not rigid categories. NIST SP 800-115 addresses planning and conducting technical security tests, analyzing findings, and developing mitigation strategies. NIST’s red-team material supports treating a red-team exercise as a broader examination of defenses, but the sources do not standardize every comparison axis above.
The core branches of a responsible red-team skill tree
1. Mission definition and authorization
Start with the purpose of the assessment: what defensive question should the exercise answer? Translate it into written scope, authorized systems and accounts, permitted and prohibited actions, time windows, contacts, escalation routes, and stop conditions. Confirm authorization with the system owner and relevant legal or compliance stakeholders before operational testing. Applicable legal obligations vary by jurisdiction; the sources cited here do not establish jurisdiction-specific requirements.
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This is a core practitioner capability, not paperwork around the “real” work. If a system, action, or data type is outside the written scope—or if the rules are unclear—pause and obtain clarification rather than assuming permission.
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2. Test planning and scenario design
Build an exercise around the mission and the organization’s defensive question. NIST SP 800-115 is a foundational guide to planning and conducting technical information-security tests, evaluating findings, and developing mitigation strategies; its publication record dates it to September 2008. It is useful for understanding the testing process, not as current tool-specific or threat-specific guidance, and NIST describes benefits and limitations of particular testing techniques.
Rank #3
MITRE ATT&CK can help describe the adversary behaviors a scenario is intended to emulate. MITRE defines ATT&CK as “a knowledge base of adversary tactics and techniques based on real-world observations.” Its terminology distinguishes:
- Tactic: the adversary’s objective or “why.”
- Technique: the general “how” used to pursue an objective.
- Sub-technique: a more specific description of a technique.
- Procedure: a particular implementation of a technique.
MITRE says ATT&CK gives red teams a common language for emulating specific threats and planning operations. Use it to make a scenario understandable and to discuss defensive coverage—not as a pass/fail checklist or proof that security is complete.
3. Controlled execution under rules of engagement
Execution means carrying out only the activities the organization has authorized, with the agreed controls and oversight. The rules of engagement should make boundaries, prohibited actions, escalation contacts, safety checks, and stop conditions usable during the exercise—not merely record them in a document that practitioners cannot consult.
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The appropriate technical methods depend on scope, the organization’s environment, and the exercise objective. The cited sources do not establish step-by-step attack procedures or endorse a particular tool, so a skill tree should not treat any one technique or product list as universally required.
4. Observation and evidence handling
A red-team exercise should produce observations that can support analysis: what was attempted within scope, what defenses or processes responded, and what evidence supports each finding. Agree in advance how evidence will be recorded, protected, and shared, especially where it could contain sensitive organizational information. Keep conclusions proportional to what the exercise actually observed; an untested control is not automatically a failed control, and an unobserved alert is not proof that no detection exists.
5. Analysis, reporting, and mitigation
Turn observations into findings the organization can act on. NIST SP 800-115 explicitly connects testing with analyzing findings and developing mitigation strategies. A useful report relates evidence to the exercise objective, explains defensive impact and uncertainty, and identifies practical corrective actions. Separate confirmed observations from interpretation so that teams can decide what to fix, what to validate further, and who owns the follow-up.
CISA’s red-team assessment report recommends exercising, testing, and validating an organization’s security program against threat behaviors mapped to MITRE ATT&CK for Enterprise. That is a recommendation in that report, not a universal compliance requirement.
How to use these frameworks without overclaiming
- Use NIST SP 800-115 for foundational thinking about test planning, execution, findings, and mitigations, while recognizing its 2008 publication date and broad scope.
- Use ATT&CK to name and organize behaviors in scenarios and to discuss defensive coverage. If citing version-dependent technique details, identify the dated ATT&CK version.
- Use red-team exercise guidance as a prompt to assess defensive capability under explicit rules of engagement, not as blanket permission to test systems.
- Use a framework mapping as a way to structure questions, not as evidence that every relevant threat or defensive gap has been covered.
These references serve different purposes: NIST SP 800-115 is a testing-process guide; ATT&CK is an evolving knowledge base of adversary behavior; and CISA’s report describes a particular assessment and offers its recommendations. None substitutes for a written engagement scope, sound judgment, or organization-specific risk decisions.
Quick Recap
Sources and their limits
- NIST SP 800-115 — publication record and guide to planning and conducting technical information-security tests, analyzing findings, and developing mitigation strategies. Published September 2008.
- MITRE ATT&CK Get Started — official resource describing ATT&CK’s purpose and terminology.
- NIST SP 800-53 Rev. 5 draft-control markup — surfaced draft material for CA-8; check final control text before relying on it as current policy language.
- CISA, “Enhancing Cyber Resilience: Insights from CISA Red Team Assessment” — report containing a recommendation to exercise, test, and validate security programs against ATT&CK-mapped threat behaviors.
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