No single safeguard can reliably prevent an autonomous weapon from selecting and attacking a target without human approval. A stronger approach combines legal prohibitions for systems that cannot be adequately understood or controlled, strict limits on any permitted system’s targets and mission, effective human supervision and intervention, and accountability throughout the system’s lifecycle. International humanitarian law already applies, but states have not agreed on a new, universally binding treaty with specific rules for autonomous weapons.
What does “selecting and attacking targets without human approval” mean?
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) describes an autonomous weapon system as one that, after activation or launch, selects and engages one or more targets in response to sensor information and a generalized target profile, without further human intervention. A person may therefore activate the system without choosing—or knowing in advance—the specific target, timing, or location of the force it applies.
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The concern is autonomy in the critical functions of selecting and applying force. It is not every use of automation or software to help military personnel make decisions. A system that recommends a target for a person to assess and approve raises different questions from one that selects and engages a target on its own.
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Human approval also should not be reduced to a label such as “human in the loop.” What matters is whether people have enough information, time, understanding, and authority to make relevant judgments and keep the system’s actions within the mission they authorized.
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What safeguards can constrain target selection and use?
Prohibit systems that cannot be sufficiently understood or controlled
The ICRC recommends prohibiting autonomous weapons designed or used so that their effects cannot be sufficiently understood, predicted, and explained. If users cannot make a sound assessment of how a system is likely to behave in its operating environment, they may be unable to judge whether its use is lawful or to anticipate indiscriminate effects. A 2024 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) working paper similarly proposed prohibiting systems that cannot be used in compliance with international law and meaningful human control. These are recommendations and proposals, not settled treaty rules.
Prohibit autonomous targeting of people
The ICRC recommends ruling out weapons designed or used to apply force against people. In August 2026, it reiterated a proposed prohibition on systems designed or used to target humans directly, alongside a recommendation to restrict permitted use to military objectives by nature. The ICRC grounds this position in humanitarian and ethical concerns, including the protection of civilians and combatants who are hors de combat. This is a strong institutional recommendation, not a prohibition already accepted as universal law.
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Set the target and mission limits before activation
For systems not prohibited, define the permitted target types and the conditions of use before activation. The ICRC’s recommendations and CCW working papers point to limits such as:
- Target: Specify what the system may engage, with restrictions that can confine use to objects that are military objectives by nature where appropriate.
- Geography and duration: Define the area and time period in which it may operate.
- Scale: Limit the number of engagements and the overall scope of the mission.
- Operational situation: Restrict use to circumstances in which the system can reliably distinguish permitted targets; avoid conditions involving civilians or civilian objects when reliable discrimination cannot be maintained.
- Mission changes: Require human approval for changes to mission parameters rather than letting the system expand or alter its own target, spatial, or temporal limits.
The last safeguard was proposed in a 2024 state submission recorded in the CCW compilation. It is an example of a state proposal, not an agreed universal requirement. These limits make the assumptions behind authorization explicit and help prevent a system from acting on targets or in circumstances outside the decision a human reviewed.
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Require effective supervision, intervention, and deactivation
People responsible for an operation need a practical opportunity to recognize when a system’s behavior is unsafe or no longer fits the context on which its use was authorized. The ICRC calls for effective human supervision and timely intervention and deactivation. A 2024 CCW working paper says those authorizing use should be able to readjust, interrupt, or deactivate a system if continued operation would take it outside the context on which legal judgments were based.
Supervision is not meaningful if an operator lacks the information to understand what the system is doing, has too little time to respond, or cannot stop it. Intervention arrangements therefore need to work under the actual operating conditions, not just exist on paper.
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How should human judgment be maintained across a system’s lifecycle?
Human control is not only a question for the moment a weapon is activated. The relevant decisions begin in design and testing and continue through legal review, mission authorization, deployment, and operation. A 2025 CCW working paper describes human judgment as including judgments relevant to compliance with international humanitarian law—particularly distinction, precautions, and proportionality. It describes control as having sufficient assurance that an activated system will act foreseeably and in conformity with applicable law, rules of engagement, and commanders’ and operators’ intentions. These are working-paper formulations, not universally binding treaty definitions.
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- Weapon parameters: Define and constrain the system’s capabilities and authorized behavior.
- Operating environment: Limit where and under what circumstances it may be used.
- Human supervision: Ensure people can understand, monitor, and intervene in its operation.
What testing and accountability measures support these safeguards?
Testing and review should assess whether a system behaves reliably and predictably within its intended limits, including in realistic operating environments. CCW proposals recorded in a 2024 compilation include readiness criteria, monitoring, emergency mission termination, operator training, security against unauthorized access, and sharing experience from weapons reviews. These are proposed measures, not one agreed international checklist.
Technical and organizational risks can undermine human control even when an operator is formally present. The 2024 CCW paper identifies data integrity and quality, algorithmic bias, automation bias, cybersecurity, AI-specific vulnerabilities, and proliferation risks as issues for layered safeguards. For example, an operator may over-trust a system’s output, or a security failure may alter its behavior. Testing, oversight, and security measures need to account for such failure modes.
Responsibility for the use of force and its consequences must remain with people. The ICRC’s 2026 position paper puts the point this way: “It is not the weapon system that must comply with IHL, but the humans using it.” The 2024 CCW working paper calls for accountability mechanisms covering development, deployment, and use. In practice, that requires clear command and operator roles and processes for oversight and investigation, rather than treating an algorithm as the decision-maker responsible for unlawful harm.
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What is binding law, and what is still being negotiated?
International humanitarian law applies to autonomous weapons as it does to other weapons. States reaffirmed its applicability in the CCW in 2019, and UN General Assembly resolutions echoed that position in 2023 and 2024, according to the ICRC. States nevertheless disagree about the specific limits and requirements existing law entails for autonomous weapons. The safeguards discussed above therefore do not all have the same legal status.
| Type of rule or measure | Status | Example |
|---|---|---|
| Existing international humanitarian law | Applies to autonomous weapons; states disagree about the specific limits and requirements it entails. | Assessment of whether a weapon’s use complies with applicable IHL. |
| ICRC recommendations | Institutional recommendations, not a universally adopted autonomous-weapons treaty. | Prohibit unpredictable systems and systems designed or used to apply force against people. |
| State submissions and CCW working papers | Proposals and formulations submitted to the negotiating process, not agreed universal requirements. | Human approval for mission-parameter changes; intervention, testing, and accountability measures. |
| Possible future treaty rules | Under discussion; no new universally binding instrument is established by the cited process updates. | Negotiations on additional legally binding limits. |
On 25 August 2026, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and ICRC President Mirjana Spoljaric called for negotiations on a legally binding instrument. They identified the CCW’s Seventh Review Conference in November 2026 as a route for states to decide whether to move toward negotiations. In an ICRC paper published on 28 August 2026, the organization said draft elements could form a basis for a possible 2027 negotiation mandate. As of 4 October 2026, those were future possibilities, not completed decisions or an adopted treaty.
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