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Design the boundary before connecting an agent
Decide what the agent needs to answer, which data it may see, and which operations it may perform. Prefer a narrow, task-specific query tool or API over unrestricted SQL when that can meet the need. If SQL is necessary, treat it as untrusted input: the server must authorize the operation and its scope independently rather than assuming model-generated SQL is safe.
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Use separate identities and credentials for the agent and for any write-capable workflow. Do not reuse a developer’s personal login or an administrator account, and do not put long-lived secrets in the model’s context. OWASP recommends minimum necessary permissions, scoped tools, and authorization for sensitive operations in its AI Agent Security Cheat Sheet and MCP Security Cheat Sheet.
Grant access to only the data the task needs
Scope access to the smallest appropriate set of databases, schemas, tables, views, and—where supported—columns. A curated view or narrow application API can keep personal, confidential, or operational data outside the agent’s reach. Read-only access is not the same as privacy: an agent can still disclose information it is permitted to read, so minimize the data returned and apply appropriate output controls.
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In PostgreSQL, privileges are granted on specific objects. Ownership is different: an object owner has inherent rights to alter or destroy that object, which ordinary privilege revocations do not reliably remove. Do not make the agent role an owner. See the PostgreSQL 18 documentation on privileges and OWASP’s Database Security Cheat Sheet.
Illustrative PostgreSQL setup
This example grants an agent login access to one database, one schema, and one view. Replace the example names with objects deliberately selected for the task; run administrative statements using an authorized administrator identity, not the agent login.
CREATE ROLE agent_reader LOGIN;
GRANT CONNECT ON DATABASE appdb TO agent_reader;
GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA reporting TO agent_reader;
GRANT SELECT ON TABLE reporting.agent_safe_view TO agent_reader;
ALTER ROLE agent_reader SET default_transaction_read_only = on;The role should not own the view or its underlying objects, nor inherit membership in a role with broader privileges. Granting access to a view also requires checking how that view is defined and what data it exposes. If access to additional objects is necessary, grant only those objects rather than broad database-wide rights.
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Use PostgreSQL read-only transactions as an extra guardrail
PostgreSQL 18 supports READ ONLY transactions. It blocks a defined set of data-modifying and schema-changing commands, including INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, MERGE, and TRUNCATE. A transaction can be marked read-only with SET TRANSACTION READ ONLY; the example role setting above makes read-only the default for its transactions. Consult PostgreSQL’s SET TRANSACTION documentation for the full behavior and command list.
This is defense in depth, not the primary permission boundary. PostgreSQL describes read-only as a high-level transaction notion and notes that it does not prevent every write to disk. The role still needs to lack write privileges, and the transaction setting must not be mistaken for a universal guarantee that nothing can be changed. These semantics are PostgreSQL-specific; verify the equivalent controls and limitations for your database engine.
Apply row-level security where users or tenants must be isolated
Table-level SELECT permission may expose every row in a table. In PostgreSQL, row-level security (RLS) policies can further restrict which rows a role may see. Once RLS is enabled, the absence of a policy allowing access defaults to deny. However, table owners and roles with the BYPASSRLS attribute ordinarily bypass RLS, so verify that the agent is neither one. PostgreSQL documents these rules in Row Security Policies.
Do not confuse broad read access with appropriately scoped read access. PostgreSQL’s predefined pg_read_all_data role grants read access across tables, views, and sequences, as well as schema usage, even without explicit grants. It does not itself have BYPASSRLS by default, but its broad object scope may still be unsuitable for an agent. See the PostgreSQL 17 Predefined Roles documentation.
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Prompts and tool descriptions can guide an agent, but they cannot enforce access. A trusted server or gateway should check every operation against the current user and task scope, validate arguments against a narrow schema, and enforce explicit allowlists. Do not treat model-generated SQL or a model’s interpretation of policy as authorization. OWASP’s SQL Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet covers safe handling of SQL inputs; its agent guidance also recommends limiting tools and enforcing permissions in trusted code.
Keep read and write capabilities separate. If a workflow genuinely needs writes, expose them through a distinct identity and tool with independent authorization and, where appropriate, explicit human approval. A read-only identity should not be able to switch to or assume that write-capable identity.
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Assume retrieved content can try to redirect the agent
Rows, documents, tool responses, and user prompts may contain instructions intended to hijack an agent into making other tool calls or exposing data. Treat retrieved text as data, not as trusted instructions. Narrow permissions limit the damage such an attempt can cause; trusted application code must still authorize the next operation. Filtering suspicious text may help detection, but it is not a replacement for access controls. OWASP describes direct and indirect prompt injection, tool abuse, and sensitive data exposure among agent risks in its AI Agent Security Cheat Sheet.
Review the access boundary as the system changes
Keep enough audit information to identify which agent identity, tool, data scope, and policy version served an operation. Redact credentials and avoid recording unnecessary sensitive values. Review grants and tool definitions whenever the agent’s tasks, prompts, tools, memory, retrieval sources, policies, or model provider change. Test the authorization boundary before production and after material changes; OWASP’s agent security guidance recommends testing at these points.
- Confirm the agent has no write grants, ownership, or inherited administrator privileges.
- Test that queries outside the approved tables, views, columns, or rows are denied.
- Check that a prompt or database value cannot cause a write-capable tool call without independent authorization.
- Verify that logs support investigation without exposing credentials or excess data.
Choose an interface and scope that fit the job
There is no single safe configuration for every database and agent platform. Use these choices to assess a design:
| Design choice | Narrower boundary | Broader or riskier boundary |
|---|---|---|
| Enforcement | Database grants and policies, reinforced by server-side authorization | A prompt or tool description with no independent enforcement |
| Data scope | Curated views, selected objects, and user- or tenant-filtered rows | Whole-database visibility without a task need |
| Agent interface | Narrowly typed, task-specific query tools or APIs | Unrestricted arbitrary SQL as the only boundary |
| Identity | Distinct, attributable identity with a managed rotation or expiry process | Shared, long-lived credentials or an administrator identity |
| Write escalation | No write path, or a separate independently authorized workflow | Read and write capability bundled into the same agent identity |
| Visibility | Reviewable access, policy changes, and operation records | Untracked grants and tool behavior |
The exact controls depend on the database and agent platform. Start with the permission boundary the database can enforce, then make trusted application code validate each tool operation and keep the agent’s readable data as limited as the task allows.
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