Marimo can support team notebook work, but whether a deployment is safe depends on its permissions, kernel exposure, sandbox sharing, secrets handling, and infrastructure boundaries. marimohub documents these controls and the operator responsibilities that come with them; its documentation does not establish a blanket security guarantee or independent security certification. Review the deployment you will actually run, rather than treating login or a role label as a complete security boundary.
First, distinguish marimohub from standalone marimo
marimohub is the self-hostable team layer: projects contain notebooks, members, integrations, and environment settings. Its documented controls include project roles, kernel access checks, sandbox lifecycle options, and configurable backends. Those controls do not automatically describe every way of running the standalone marimo editor or server. See the marimohub announcement and the marimohub security model.
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The security model describes marimohub as running notebook code for authenticated users. Authentication establishes who is connecting; project authorization and infrastructure configuration determine what that person or notebook can access. A deployment’s risk therefore also depends on its version, compute backend, ingress, identity provider, and configuration.
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What marimohub roles let team members do
The overview describes four roles. The security guide adds important action-level qualifications: notebook writes require editor or higher, and membership changes and audit-log reads require manager or higher. Kernel access follows the same project role gates. Use the project’s authorization settings to decide who can perform each action, rather than assuming that a role name protects every kind of data.
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| Role | Documented access | Security implication |
|---|---|---|
| App user | Run shared apps without access to notebook source | Hiding source does not hide information the app displays or makes available to download. |
| Viewer | Inspect notebooks and saved outputs | Notebook and output visibility is broader than access to a source-hidden app. |
| Editor | Change notebooks; notebook writes require editor or higher | Editors attaching to edit sessions can use terminal and agent surfaces that have access to notebook credentials. |
| Manager | Control membership and sharing; manager or higher is required for membership changes and audit-log reads | Reserve this role for people trusted to administer project access. |
Two separate questions matter when sharing a project: can someone read or change the notebook, and can they see data through the app or its outputs? An app user’s lack of source access answers only the first question; it does not prevent the app from revealing data in its interface or downloads. Check the actual app outputs and data paths before granting access.
Choose kernel exposure with its trade-offs in view
marimohub documents two kernel exposure modes. The default subdomain mode and the proxy mode place the trust boundary in different places; neither removes the need to trust notebook code and configure the surrounding deployment correctly.
| Mode | Request and origin boundary | What the operator must account for |
|---|---|---|
subdomain (default) |
The browser connects directly to kernel hosts on a separate domain. The hub does not authenticate direct kernel traffic. | Protect kernel endpoints at ingress. Native kernel authentication is optional and off by default. Sibling subdomains share cookie scope; separate registrable domains give stronger isolation from cookies set by notebooks. |
proxy |
Kernel requests pass through the app and are checked against authentication and per-session roles; kernels are same-origin with the app. | The same-origin arrangement creates a documented risk that malicious notebook code can script the control plane. Configuration requires an explicit acknowledgement and is documented for trusted environments. If notebook apps are exposed this way, trust every notebook author in the deployment. |
These are not simply “less secure” and “more secure” settings. With subdomain, the key operational question is whether direct kernel endpoints are protected and how cookie scope is arranged. With proxy, requests receive hub authorization checks, but same-origin scripting makes notebook-author trust especially important. The deployment-specific configuration details are in the security model.
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Decide whether editors should share a sandbox
A shared editing experience can also mean shared runtime state. According to the security guide, editors sharing a sandbox may share its process, files, environment, secrets, and credentials. The relevant choice is whether all project editors should be trusted with that state—not merely whether collaboration in one runtime is convenient.
| Sandbox setting | Documented consequence | Use it when |
|---|---|---|
shared |
Editors may share process state, files, environment, secrets, and credentials in the sandbox. | Every editor in the project is trusted with the sandbox’s runtime state. |
exclusive |
Provides the option to avoid sharing the editor sandbox between users. | User-specific files or settings should not be exposed to other editors. |
Choose the setting based on the sensitivity of the process and its contents. If collaborators should be able to edit notebook code but should not share runtime credentials or files, do not treat a shared sandbox as a harmless convenience.
Keep credentials out of persisted workspace files
Workspace persistence can turn a temporary file into project-readable, restorable state. In workspace mode, marimohub captures runtime files, including hidden files such as .env, stores them with the notebook workspace, makes captured files readable to project members with read access, and restores them into later sessions. The security guide recommends using integration secrets rather than workspace files for credentials.
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Distinguish three credential paths when reviewing a deployment:
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MARIMOHUB_*configuration values out of source and inject them through deployment secret management. - Project integrations: use integration secrets for credentials needed by project integrations instead of placing them in workspace files.
- Notebook runtime credentials: supported container and compute setups can pass session environment values through stdin into private files outside the workspace, but notebook code can read its own credentials. Do not assume a credential is hidden from the code that uses it.
These distinctions and the workspace persistence behavior are described in the security model. For Azure deployments, the guide recommends storing deployment secrets in Key Vault and injecting them through deployment tooling. It says there is no built-in Key Vault resolver for integration fields and no Azure federation broker; Azure workload identity requires platform configuration. Avoid copying deployment credentials into notebook images or project environment variables.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Separate notebook permissions from cloud and storage permissions
Hub authentication does not grant a notebook access to Azure resources. The Azure deployment guide recommends using distinct hub and notebook identities, scoping the storage identity to the deployment’s private blob container, and applying network restrictions such as Kubernetes NetworkPolicy where applicable. Configure notebook permissions separately from the hub’s storage identity, so the notebook does not inherit broader access merely because the hub can store project data.
The same principle applies beyond the Azure example: review which identity executes notebook code, what it can reach on the network, and which storage or service permissions it receives. The Azure deployment guide documents the Azure-specific recommendations; it is not evidence that other infrastructure is configured safely by default.
Standalone marimo has different exposure controls
If you are not using marimohub, do not assume its project roles, integration handling, or kernel authorization model applies to your deployment. Standalone marimo’s watched-folder feature can make new notebooks in a watched directory appear in the gallery and execute when opened. The documentation recommends watching only trusted directories and enabling authentication when exposing the server remotely. See Using your own editor: watching files.
For Kubernetes, marimo’s guide describes the operator and kubectl-marimo workflow. Its configuration table lists token authentication as the default and auth = "none" as the setting that disables it. Confirm the configuration for the version you deploy in the Kubernetes guide, published October 1, 2026. These standalone controls should not be confused with marimohub’s project-level authorization.
Pre-deployment review checklist
- Map access to actions. Decide who can run apps, inspect notebooks and outputs, edit notebooks, manage membership, and read audit logs. Test both source visibility and the data that apps display or provide for download.
- Select kernel mode deliberately. For
subdomain, verify ingress protection for direct kernel traffic and assess cookie scope. Forproxy, acknowledge the same-origin scripting risk and admit only notebook authors you trust. - Set the sandbox boundary. Use
sharedonly if every project editor can be trusted with shared process state, files, environment, secrets, and credentials; chooseexclusivewhen user-specific state matters. - Inspect persistence paths. Check whether workspace capture can include hidden files such as
.env, and keep credentials in integration secrets or deployment secret management rather than persisted workspace files. - Review execution identities and network access. Confirm which identity notebook code receives, which storage and cloud resources it can access, and what network boundaries constrain it. For Azure, keep hub and notebook identities separate and scope storage access as the deployment guide recommends.
- Test with the deployed configuration. Verify the actual role gates, kernel reachability, file persistence, sandbox sharing, and cloud permissions for the version, backend, ingress, and identity provider in use.
What the documentation does—and does not—establish
The official pages describe product behavior and recommended configuration, not a guarantee that any particular deployment is secure or compliant with a regulation. The reviewed official sources do not provide an independent audit report or security certification claim. A team should make its decision from the deployed version’s security documentation and its own checks of access boundaries, identities, and network exposure.
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