Enforce an AI agent’s API permissions in trusted backend software—not in the prompt. Let the model propose a tool call, then have an API gateway, service, or tool execution proxy check the caller, operation, resource, and context before it runs. Give the agent a separate identity with only the task-specific access it needs, and require an independent approval or policy check for high-impact actions.
Why a prompt cannot enforce API permissions
An instruction such as “never delete records” does not remove the agent’s ability to call a delete endpoint. The instruction may be misinterpreted or overridden by malicious content in a document or web page. If the agent’s credential can delete records, the backend must reject that operation unless the caller’s identity and policy authorize it. OWASP advises enforcing permissions at the backend rather than relying on prompts alone in its General Controls guidance.
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Treat a model-generated tool choice, argument, classification, or confidence score as a request—not as an authorization grant. OWASP’s AI Agent Security Cheat Sheet recommends applying least privilege to agent tools and permissions.
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| Decision | Weak design | Safer design |
|---|---|---|
| Enforcement location | Prompt or model behavior is expected to block disallowed actions. | A gateway, service, or tool execution proxy checks each call independently. OWASP General Controls: backend enforcement. |
| Permission scope | A broad account or API key can reach unrelated tools, operations, or resources. | Per-tool and per-operation permissions allow only the resources needed for the task. OWASP: least privilege. |
| Identity binding | Shared credentials obscure which agent or initiating user requested an operation. | A distinct agent identity is checked alongside the delegated user or session, tenant, and intended audience. NIST discusses identity and permission checks in its agent identity guidance. |
| Credential lifetime | Long-lived credentials retain broad authority beyond the immediate task. | Short-lived, task-scoped credentials limit duration as well as scope; separate read access from write or administrative access. See OWASP’s General Controls and MCP07:2025. |
| High-impact actions | All tool calls execute automatically once the agent requests them. | Sensitive actions receive independent validation or approval for the precise operation and target. OWASP: AI Agent Security Cheat Sheet. |
| Untrusted content | One agent processes hostile input while holding broad tool access. | Where practical, isolate document parsing from the tool-enabled execution component. OWASP describes quarantined parsing in its prompt-injection guidance. |
Build the authorization boundary around the agent
- List the necessary operations. Start from what the workflow must accomplish, then identify the specific API operations and resources it needs. Do not expose a general-purpose shell or unrestricted API proxy if a small set of tools will do.
- Create a distinct agent identity. Give the agent or security boundary its own identity rather than copying a developer’s broad access or using a shared human credential. If it acts for a user, carry that user’s identity or narrowly delegated authority through the call chain.
- Issue narrow, task-scoped credentials. Keep reusable secrets out of prompts. Prefer credentials limited to the required operations and resources, and to the task’s lifetime. Separate read-only authority from write-capable or administrative authority. A short lifetime does not make an overbroad permission set safe.
- Check every call at execution time. At the gateway, service, or tool endpoint, validate the caller and requested action against backend policy. Bind the decision to the initiating user or session, tenant, audience, resource, operation, and arguments. Re-check when the user or task context changes; do not rely on earlier orchestration checks.
- Constrain tool inputs. Use narrow typed schemas, strict allowlists for tools, operations, resources, hosts, and methods, and deny-by-default parsing. Reject malformed or out-of-policy requests rather than letting the model’s interpretation decide what is permitted.
- Gate sensitive actions. For financial, administrative, destructive, or externally visible operations, require an independent policy decision or approval. Present the actual action and target for approval, then have the execution component verify both the actor’s authority and the required approval before proceeding.
OWASP’s guidance supports per-tool scopes, separate credentials for read and write or high-impact operations, and task-scoped ephemeral credentials where possible: General Controls.
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Contain prompt injection without trusting it away
Treat user-provided and retrieved documents, web pages, emails, tool descriptions, and API responses as untrusted input. Prompt injection can try to redirect an agent’s goals or tool selection. Least privilege limits what the agent can do even if that attempt succeeds; backend authorization still decides whether the resulting call is allowed.
If a workflow allows it, separate reading or extraction from acting: examine untrusted content in a component with no tool access, then pass only the necessary result to a tool-enabled component. OWASP calls this quarantined parsing in its LLM Prompt Injection Prevention Cheat Sheet. This separation reduces exposure, but does not replace authorization at the API boundary.
Apply the same checks to MCP tools
For an MCP implementation, check scopes at each tool endpoint and bind short-lived tokens to the session and permitted actions. Do not assume that an authenticated connection or an earlier orchestration decision authorizes every tool call. OWASP’s MCP07:2025 guidance identifies missing scope checks as an authorization weakness and recommends scoped, short-lived tokens.
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Record decisions without recording secrets
Keep structured audit records sufficient to reconstruct who or what requested an operation, which policy applied, and whether the call was allowed. Avoid putting reusable credentials in prompts or plain-text logs. For high-impact calls, the record should make the authorization decision and any required approval reviewable without exposing the secret used to authenticate.
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