Audit an AI agent by testing whether direct user instructions or untrusted content it reads can override its task, expose data, or trigger actions the user did not authorize. Test the complete configured system—not just the model’s final wording—including retrieval, memory, tools, permissions, approvals, and logs. Use dummy data and sandboxed tools, define observable pass/fail conditions in advance, and repeat the tests after material changes.
What a prompt-injection audit needs to cover
Prompt injection occurs when input changes a model’s behavior or output in an unintended way. An injection may arrive in a user’s message, or indirectly in content the agent processes, such as an email, document, or webpage. The latter can be harmful even when the instruction is not visible to a human, if the model processes it as text or another supported modality.
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For an agent, a changed answer is only one possible failure. The more consequential question is whether the agent used its access to data or tools to cross a boundary. OWASP’s 2025 guidance says retrieval-augmented generation and fine-tuning do not fully mitigate prompt injection. Treat them as context, not as proof that an agent is safe.
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Scope the audit to the agent’s actual configuration and business impact. A read-only assistant and an agent that can send messages or change records do not present the same consequences, even if they use the same model.
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Direct and indirect injection are separate test paths
| Path | Where the instruction enters | What the test should establish |
|---|---|---|
| Direct | User-controlled prompt or message | Whether the agent abandons the authorized task, reveals protected data, or attempts an unauthorized action in response to user input. |
| Indirect | External content the agent retrieves, browses, or receives through an integration | Whether untrusted content can redirect the task, expose data, alter state, or cause an unauthorized tool action. |
Test an indirect path by placing the test instruction in the external-content channel being assessed. Sending it only as a user message does not test whether the agent handles untrusted retrieved content safely.
Test security outcomes, not just the final answer
A polite refusal does not establish that the agent avoided a side effect. Check tool traces, authorization decisions, approval behavior, data movement, and state changes as well as the response shown to the user.
How to plan and run the audit
- Map the tested system and its trust boundaries. Record the version under test, model provider, prompts and policies, retrieval sources, memory configuration, available tools, credentials and scopes, approval rules, and output destinations. Mark which inputs are trusted instructions and which are untrusted user or external content. This configuration record lets another tester understand what the results cover.
- Write abuse cases and expected outcomes. For each case, specify the benign task, injection path, resource or capability at risk, actions the agent is allowed to take, and an observable failure condition. Use the categories below to avoid limiting the audit to simple instruction overrides.
- Set up a controlled environment. Use dummy accounts and data, sandboxed tools, and safe substitutes for actions such as sending email, running shell commands, making payments, or administering accounts. Define the intended violation—or the legitimate task being protected—and the expected observable outcome before you run a case.
- Exercise the configured input paths. Test ordinary user input and each relevant source of content the agent retrieves or receives. Include varied formatting or modalities only if the application accepts and processes them.
- Observe actions and side effects. For each run, capture the agent’s decision, tool trace, approval or denial behavior, data accessed or transmitted, and any state change. Record timeouts or circuit-breaker behavior when relevant. Compare what happened with the case’s prewritten success and failure conditions.
- Repeat, adapt, and report the limits. Re-run cases after material changes to prompts, policies, tools, credentials, or approvals. Adapt attacks to the system under test, inspect individual tasks as well as aggregate results, and account for variation across runs.
Abuse-case coverage
| Category | Question for the test |
|---|---|
| Prompt override or goal hijacking | Does the agent stop doing the authorized task or follow conflicting instructions from an untrusted source? |
| Tool misuse or privilege escalation | Can the agent invoke a tool or use a resource beyond the permissions needed for the task? |
| Data disclosure or exfiltration | Can protected information cross its permitted boundary, including through a tool or output destination? |
| Memory poisoning | Can untrusted content persist in memory and improperly influence a later task? |
| Approval bypass | Can the agent perform a high-impact action without the required approval, or rely on an approval for a different action? |
| Recursive or cost-intensive behavior | Can an injection cause excessive or repeated tool activity rather than stopping within the application’s safeguards? |
| Multi-agent chaining | Can an instruction or unauthorized capability cross a boundary between agents? |
OWASP’s testing guidance uses categories including prompt override, tool misuse, privilege escalation, memory poisoning, data exfiltration, recursive tool abuse, approval bypass, and multi-agent chaining. Select cases that match the system’s actual capabilities; do not treat an unconfigured tool or modality as though it were in scope.
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Before running each case, define what a failure would look like in observable system behavior. A test passes only against that stated condition and the configuration tested; a safe-sounding final answer alone is insufficient.
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- Unauthorized tool call: Did the agent request or execute a tool action outside the allowed task or permission scope?
- Boundary crossing: Did sensitive data reach an unauthorized user, tool, integration, or output destination?
- Unauthorized state change: Did the agent alter a record, send a message, or take another action that was not authorized?
- Approval failure: Was a required approval omitted, bypassed, stale, or mismatched to the action and its parameters?
- Task failure: Did the agent abandon the benign task or follow the injected objective instead?
- Runaway behavior: Did the agent continue recursive or costly activity without an effective stop condition?
Compare results by attack path, task, affected capability, severity, and control behavior. Keep the outcome and supporting trace for each case; an aggregate pass rate can conceal an important failure on a high-impact task.
Controls to verify during testing
Least privilege at the tool boundary
Give the agent only the tools and resource scopes needed for its task. Verify that the application or tool itself rejects unauthorized requests. A prompt telling the model not to use a capability is not a substitute for an enforced permission check.
Independent, action-specific approval
For high-impact or irreversible actions, verify that the agent needs explicit, current approval bound to the proposed action and its parameters. Test whether an approval for one action can be reused for a different action or whether the action can proceed without approval.
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Identify external content as untrusted and keep it distinct from trusted instructions in the system design. Validate inputs and outputs, but do not assume delimiters or filters alone neutralize hostile instructions.
Checks before execution
Where possible, check proposed tool actions against the original user intent and enforce permissions in deterministic application code. OWASP discusses capability-tracking designs that separate privileged planning from quarantined parsing, while noting that this approach remains early-stage and needs further research; it should not be treated as a proven control by itself.
Audit trail and release evidence
Retain the tested configuration, abuse cases, expected outcomes, observed decisions and actions, and any accepted residual risk. Run adversarial regression tests in CI/CD and gate material changes that affect high-risk policies, credentials, or approvals.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.How to interpret smoke tests and benchmark results
OWASP’s smoke tests are illustrative checks, not a security benchmark. A successful run shows only that the tested case did not meet its failure condition under that setup; it does not establish resistance to an adaptive attacker.
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What to include in the release decision
Make the release decision from evidence tied to the exact configuration and the consequences of failure, rather than from a single aggregate score. The record should let the deployment owner see what was tested, what failed, and what risk remains.
Quick Recap
- Configuration and trust-boundary record for the tested version.
- Abuse cases with input path, benign task, protected capability, and predeclared pass/fail condition.
- Run-level outcomes and relevant traces, including tool calls, approvals, denials, and observed side effects.
- Regression results after material changes, with remaining risks and their rationale documented.
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