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Election offices can prepare for AI-generated misinformation by deciding in advance who receives and verifies reports, who approves public statements, and where voters can find authoritative information. Rehearse realistic scenarios, preserve reports and context, and route incidents through existing security and communications procedures rather than relying on a social post or an AI detector to establish the facts.
How can election officials prepare for AI-generated misinformation?
Build a plan that fits your jurisdiction’s laws, agency responsibilities, and current incident procedures. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) advises election offices to plan for content review and public communications if a candidate or other official is deepfaked to spread false claims about election administration. Its 2024 discussion also recommends tabletop practice, trust-building, awareness of foreign influence tactics, and multi-factor authentication (MFA) for data and applications.
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Assign named people and backups for each role. A compact responsibility list can prevent a report from sitting in an inbox while staff debate who is allowed to act:
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- Verification: checks election claims against the responsible authority’s records and consults relevant officials.
- Review: brings in legal, security, or policy staff when the issue requires their advice.
- Approval and release: identifies who can authorize a statement and who publishes it through official channels.
- Escalation: lists current contacts and routes for incidents that require action beyond the communications team.
Put official channels, approval rules, coordination with voting locations, and a process for correcting already-published information in a short communications plan. Keep contact and escalation details current. For security procedures, consult your jurisdiction’s existing process and the EAC’s Election Security Preparedness resources, which include an incident-response checklist.
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Make the trusted-information route familiar before a rumor spreads
Maintain a voter-facing official page with current dates, locations, eligibility information, and voting procedures. Use stable links and make the page’s official status unmistakable. Tell voters how to reach it in advance, then point to it in concise, evidence-based updates when a rumor creates a specific question. The EAC’s AI and Election Administration page offers a handout template designed to direct voters to official sources; check the dates and applicability of individual materials.
Trust also depends on routine contact, not just crisis messaging. Build relationships with the public and local stakeholders before an incident so voters recognize the official source and know where to check election information.
What should election staff practice before Election Day?
The EAC recommends adding AI-related scenarios to tabletop exercises or similar staff training. Use scenarios that fit local operations and make participants practice the handoffs: who receives a report, which records can verify a claim, who is consulted, who approves a response, and which channel reaches affected voters.
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Scenarios worth rehearsing include:
- An audio or video clip impersonating an election official.
- Fabricated imagery attributed to an official or election office.
- False claims about a polling place, voting hours, or another voting procedure.
- An email or text message designed to steal an employee’s credentials.
A December 15–16, 2023 tabletop conducted by Arizona’s Secretary of State’s office with the Brennan Center, the Elections Group, and the Institute for the Future used illustrative scenarios involving credential-harvesting emails or texts, an audio deepfake attributed to a state official, and fabricated images of an election official. These were exercise scenarios, not reports of actual events. They can inform discussion, but each office should adapt practice to its own responsibilities and incident channels. The Brennan Center’s account is available at Preparing for AI Deepfakes and Election Disinformation.
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Include routine security habits in the exercise. The EAC’s 2024 discussion specifically calls out MFA for data and applications. Staff should know how to report suspicious messages or media internally, and should follow established controls rather than opening an unexpected link or supplying credentials in response to an urgent-looking request.
What should our office do if a deepfake appears?
Use the jurisdiction’s incident process; the following workflow translates federal recommendations into practical communications steps. It does not replace local legal, law-enforcement, emergency, or security procedures.
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- Record the report. Note what was reported, where it appeared, when it was seen, and any available link or original file. Preserve the material and its context according to office policy.
- Route it to the designated lead. Use the internal reporting mechanism, not an improvised group chat as the sole record. Do not treat a single social post or an AI detector’s output as proof of what happened.
- Verify the underlying election claim. Check it against records held by the responsible election authority and contact the appropriate office or incident contacts. The key communications question is often whether the voting information being claimed is accurate, regardless of how a clip was made.
- Decide whether a public response is needed. Identify the precise voter question the response should answer, then follow the office’s review and approval rules.
- Publish through established official channels. Direct voters to the authoritative information page and coordinate with affected voting locations and stakeholders as the response plan requires.
- Document and learn. Keep a record of the decision and update the plan after the incident or exercise.
CISA’s Risk in Focus: Generative AI and the 2024 Election Cycle, explicitly dated “As of January 18, 2024,” recommends proactive communications, standard response procedures for suspected manipulated media, and internal reporting mechanisms. It is useful as dated procedural guidance, not as a current threat assessment.
How do we choose channels for voter updates?
Use the channels your office can control and maintain, and judge them by the practical job they need to do: reaching affected voters quickly, linking back to authoritative information, and allowing corrections when details change. No channel removes the need for staff capacity and approval.
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| Channel | Useful role | What to plan for |
|---|---|---|
| Official election information page | Stable destination for complete, current voting instructions and corrections. | Keep content current, clearly identify it as official, and make the URL easy to share. |
| Established official social accounts | Quickly signal that an update exists and direct followers to the authoritative page. | Confirm who can post, how claims are reviewed, and how posts link to fuller information. |
| Direct coordination with voting locations and local stakeholders | Help staff and partners respond consistently when a claim concerns a specific place or procedure. | Maintain contact routes and coordinate through the incident plan; this is not a substitute for public voter information. |
Choose a primary destination and a repeatable pattern: state the verified fact in plain language, answer the voter question, and provide the official link. Avoid amplifying an unverified claim unnecessarily. Where a correction is required, use the established process to update the authoritative page and any earlier official posts or notices.
How should offices avoid overreacting to deepfakes?
Prepare for plausible harms without treating every suspicious clip as consequential. An authenticity detector cannot by itself establish who created a file, whether it was altered, or whether the claim inside it is true. Verify election facts through authoritative records and responsible officials, and make a public statement when it serves a clear voter-information need.
In the EAC’s 2024 discussion, Ginny Badanes of Microsoft’s Democracy Forward program cautioned: “While we look at the challenges of AI and deepfakes, it’s a matter of considering the challenges but not overhyping the threats.” The practical balance is readiness without alarmism: train staff, protect accounts, document reports, and keep voters connected to accurate official information.
A separate October 25, 2024 joint statement from ODNI, the FBI, and CISA is a historical example of official messaging that advised people to consult trusted state and local election sources; it is not a live alert. It can be found at Joint ODNI, FBI, CISA Statement on Foreign Threats to 2024 U.S. Federal Elections.
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