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U.S. oversight officials have identified a credible concern that airport body scanners may send some passengers to additional screening more often than others. But public evidence does not show how large any disparity is nationwide, or establish that aviation security as a whole screens too much. The central problem is whether screening is effective, proportionate, consistently applied and monitored for unequal effects.
Why do some people get pulled aside at airport security?
An advanced imaging technology (AIT) scanner can identify an anomaly that prompts an officer to conduct additional screening. That referral may be an intended part of the process; it does not, by itself, show that a passenger was wrongly flagged or treated unfairly.
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In 2023, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that officials at four selected airports and representatives of seven selected stakeholder organizations told it AIT may refer transgender passengers, people wearing religious headwear and passengers with disabilities for additional screening more often than other passengers. Those interviews raise a reason to investigate, not a nationwide estimate. GAO’s public testimony does not provide group-specific referral rates or a completed analysis showing whether the differences reflect discrimination, scanner behavior or other causes. GAO’s 2023 testimony says TSA had begun collecting data on referrals and their causes and planned to assess it.
It is therefore more precise to describe over-screening as a governance and measurement problem than as a proven national rate of unnecessary searches. The evidence calls for checking both whether screening detects threats and who bears the burden of extra screening.
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Are airport body scanners accurate?
Accuracy has more than one dimension. A screening technology needs to detect prohibited items at the required rate while keeping incorrect flags within an established maximum. A referral can be justified by an anomaly, but the overall system also needs to measure how often it generates referrals that do not lead to a threat finding.
GAO’s 2019 review found that certification before deployment and routine calibration do not, by themselves, establish that a system continues to meet detection requirements over time. DHS tested a sample of deployed explosives trace detection and bottled-liquid scanner units in 2015 and 2016 and found that some no longer met requirements. That finding applies to the tested sample and those technologies at that time; it is not a current failure rate for all airport equipment.
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GAO summarized the underlying concern this way: “Technology performance can degrade over time; however, TSA does not ensure that technologies continue to meet detection requirements after deployment to airports.” The 2019 report also explains that operationalizing the detection standards it reviewed took two to seven years, depending on manufacturers’ technical capabilities and other factors.
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What oversight found about technology after deployment
Deployment is not the end of assurance. A technology can pass certification and be calibrated for routine use yet still need field testing to show it continues to meet its detection requirements. GAO reported that TSA policy calls for post-implementation reviews, with periodic reviews planned every two to three years; justified and approved changes to the review frequency are possible.
GAO’s recommendation updates show that implementation remains an oversight issue. In February 2026, TSA reported developing field test plans for certain deployed systems, and GAO said it still planned to assess the results. The public record therefore describes a review policy and continuing work, not a completed demonstration that every deployed system is meeting its requirements.
Does TSA place screening technology according to risk?
GAO’s 2019 review found that TSA generally based technology placement on logistical factors and did not sufficiently document how risk shaped where and in what order systems were deployed. TSA later said training, logistics, site readiness and long-term operational efficiency were often predominant considerations. Its February 2026 update said other factors continued to drive initial and subsequent deployment needs while risk was more constant, and that TSA would reassess its guidance.
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GAO noted that TSA guidance told officials to assess airport risk but did not require them to document those assessments. Without a record of how risk informed placement, outside reviewers have less basis to determine whether deployment choices match potential threats. As GAO put it, “Moving forward, increased transparency about TSA’s decisions would better ensure that deployment of technologies matches potential risks.” The report and recommendation updates describe the documentation gap and subsequent agency responses.
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Risk-based or expedited screening is one policy alternative to applying identical procedures to every passenger. It raises a distinct evaluation question: does the process preserve threat detection while reducing unnecessary burden, and can its overall effectiveness be measured? GAO’s March 2015 testimony offers historical context, not a description of current TSA procedures.
At that time, GAO described TSA PreCheck eligibility as including approved known-traveler lists and automated passenger risk assessments. The Managed Inclusion process used random selection, behavior-detection officers, and canine teams or explosives-trace detection. GAO said TSA had tested individual layers, while noting concerns about their effectiveness and the need to evaluate the combined process using sound methods. Testing components separately does not establish that the full screening system works as intended. GAO’s 2015 testimony should not be read as confirmation of today’s eligibility rules, operational arrangements or results.
What the public evidence does not establish
The public sources discussed here do not provide current nationwide rates for extra referrals, false alarms or screening that proves unnecessary. GAO’s 2023 testimony reports concerns raised in selected interviews but does not quantify a national disparity. The DHS Office of Inspector General’s public listing confirms that a 2017 covert-testing report identified vulnerabilities in screener performance, equipment and procedures and made eight recommendations; it says the test details are classified or Sensitive Security Information. Those unavailable details cannot support public claims about a national failure percentage. The OIG’s public report listing identifies the limits on what is disclosed.
These gaps matter because threat detection and unequal burden are separate questions. A system might detect threats while still imposing avoidable or uneven referrals; a disparity alone, in turn, does not prove an incorrect alarm or discrimination. A useful public assessment would measure referral rates and causes by technology and passenger group, evaluate outcomes against detection requirements, and assess whether procedures comply with TSA’s non-discrimination policies—while protecting passenger privacy.
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