A scaled influence operation is a coordinated effort to shape an audience’s attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes across a broad or sustained set of accounts, channels, audiences, languages, or other assets. “Scaled” describes breadth and reach, not a fixed number: the sources below establish no universal minimum for accounts, impressions, or platforms. Disinformation can be used, but it is not required by every broad definition.
What does “influence operation” mean?
The term describes organized activity intended to affect what people think or do, or the decisions and outcomes they produce. Definitions differ by institution and context, so the actor, purpose, methods, and evidence matter as much as the label.
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Norway’s Strategy for Strengthening Resilience to Disinformation (2025–2030) describes state influence operations as overt and covert campaigns, often conducted without military force, to change attitudes, decisions, or outcomes. Political processes are a frequent target, but the strategy also identifies goals such as reinforcing polarization, spreading distrust, or creating unrest. It states: “Disinformation is one of several tools used to achieve this.”
A narrower social-media definition appears in a 2020 peer-reviewed study: coordinated campaigns by an organization, party, or state to affect politics through social media, using content designed to appear indigenous to the target audience or country. The study identified at least 53 coordinated influence efforts targeting 24 countries from 2013 to 2018; that is a historical study finding, not a current total or complete census. Science Advances study (2020)
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What makes an operation “scaled”?
Scale is best understood through the operation’s breadth, reach, and persistence. No universal numeric threshold is established in the cited sources, so a particular account count or post volume alone cannot define whether an operation is scaled.
- Assets: the number and types of accounts, websites, organizations, or other resources involved.
- Channels: whether activity spans one service or multiple platforms and other media.
- Audience and geography: the number of target groups, countries, or communities addressed.
- Languages: whether content is tailored for audiences in different languages.
- Coordination and persistence: how assets amplify one another and whether the activity continues or adapts over time.
These dimensions help describe reach; they are not a formal scoring system. A large campaign can be coordinated across many assets, while a smaller operation may still be influential in a specific context.
How is an influence operation different from disinformation or platform CIB?
These terms overlap but are not interchangeable. Disinformation is one possible instrument within an influence operation, rather than a necessary feature of every broad definition. Concealment is also common in some definitions, but an operation may include overt activity.
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“Foreign malign influence operation” is a narrower legal term in U.S. statutory text. It describes coordinated, often concealed activity involving tools such as disinformation, press manipulation, economic coercion, targeted investments, corruption, or academic censorship, tied to specified foreign-policy aims. That legal definition should not be applied automatically to every use of “influence operation.” U.S. Code, 50 U.S.C. § 3059
Platform labels are narrower still. Meta’s Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB) term refers to a network that centrally relies on fake accounts to mislead people about who is behind the activity and what they are doing. X’s representative described a related platform concept as multiple accounts artificially influencing or disrupting conversation, including through identical content, bots, or deceptive amplification. These criteria concern platform behavior; neither label defines the whole category of influence operations.
In evidence to the UK Parliament on 9 March 2026, an X representative said: “We define co-ordinated inauthentic behaviour as the operation of multiple accounts to artificially influence or disrupt conversations.” UK Parliament oral evidence (9 March 2026)
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What can a documented example show?
Meta reported in September 2022 that it disrupted a Russian-origin operation targeting primarily Germany, as well as France, Italy, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. According to Meta’s investigation, the operation used more than 60 websites impersonating legitimate European news organizations, published original articles and other material, and amplified content across multiple internet services. It operated in several languages and attempted to establish new websites after domains were blocked. Meta’s report (September 2022)
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How should two alleged operations be compared?
Use the same questions for each case, and keep reported findings distinct from independently established facts. No single scoring rubric is prescribed by the cited sources.
- Actor and sponsorship: Who is alleged to be behind the activity, and what evidence supports that attribution?
- Objective and audience: What attitudes, behavior, decisions, or outcomes were targeted, and among whom?
- Methods: Was activity overt, concealed, or a combination? Which instruments were used?
- Coordination: What evidence shows that accounts or other assets worked together?
- Reach: Which platforms, channels, countries, audiences, and languages were involved?
- Duration: How long did the activity persist, and did it adapt after disruption?
- Attribution quality: Is the claim made by a government, platform, academic study, or another source, and what evidence does that source provide?
Why definitions vary
Different sources define the term for different purposes: academic analysis may focus on political activity on social media; a government strategy may include broader state campaigns; a statute may define a specific foreign-policy threat; and a platform policy may focus on deceptive account networks. Identify the source and its scope whenever you use the label. This avoids treating platform enforcement categories or a specific legal definition as a universal standard.
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