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A free scan shows the junk files, broken settings and background clutter dragging Windows down - then fixes them in one click.Free scan · Windows 10 & 11Organizations should prepare for quantum-era cryptography before a computer capable of breaking today’s public-key encryption exists. An attacker can copy encrypted information now and keep it in the hope of decrypting it later. That creates a present risk for data that must stay confidential for years, even though no cryptographically relevant quantum computer is known to exist and its arrival date is uncertain.
How “harvest now, decrypt later” works
In a harvest-now, decrypt-later attack, an adversary captures encrypted data while current cryptography still protects it, stores the ciphertext, and hopes future quantum capability will make decryption feasible. The attack does not mean the data has already been decrypted or that current encryption has been broken.
The concern is the gap between how long information must remain secret and how long a migration may take. NIST says secrets that remain valuable for many years are relevant to this risk. The joint CISA, NSA, and NIST factsheet likewise emphasizes long secrecy lifetimes and early readiness planning.
Why prepare when quantum computers cannot break encryption yet?
There is no established date for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. NIST says estimates vary widely and no one knows when one will be built, so a forecast should not be treated as a deadline. But an organization does not need to wait for a working quantum attack to have a problem: data intercepted today may still be valuable when decryption becomes possible.
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Migration itself also takes time. NIST notes that integrating a newly standardized algorithm into information systems can take 10 to 20 years. That is a general historical observation, not a prediction that every organization’s transition will take that long. It does underline why waiting for certainty about the arrival date could leave too little time to protect long-lived information.
NIST mathematician Dustin Moody, who leads its post-quantum cryptography standardization project, put the guidance plainly: “We encourage organizations to begin their transition to these standards immediately to ensure their data remains secure in the quantum era.”
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Which data and systems should be prioritized?
Begin with the information whose confidentiality must last the longest, then trace the systems and cryptographic dependencies that protect it. A useful prioritization review weighs several factors together:
| Factor | What to assess |
|---|---|
| Confidentiality lifetime | How many years must the information remain secret? Prioritize data that may still be sensitive into the organization’s migration horizon. |
| Sensitivity and impact | How serious would disclosure be for people, operations, or the organization? Give higher priority to highly sensitive information and high-impact systems. |
| Cryptographic dependency | Where does public-key cryptography appear in applications, services, network protocols, certificates, software or firmware updates, devices, and vendor products? |
| Supplier readiness | What are vendors’ migration roadmaps, testing timelines, upgrade plans, and plans for cryptography embedded in their products? |
| Compatibility and legacy constraints | Can the system interoperate with the planned changes? Is modernization feasible, or will a legacy system need a different upgrade or replacement path? |
What organizations can do now
- Discover cryptography in use. Identify public-key cryptography across applications, services, protocols, certificates, devices, software and firmware updates, and supplier products. Include dependencies that may be embedded or difficult to see.
- Build an inventory tied to data risk. Record which assets use which cryptographic dependencies and connect that information to the sensitivity and required confidentiality lifetime of the data they protect. Keep the inventory current as systems and suppliers change.
- Rank systems for migration. Use data lifetime, sensitivity, impact, and quantum-vulnerable dependencies to decide what should move first. Include legacy systems in the plan rather than assuming every component can be upgraded on the same schedule.
- Engage suppliers early. Ask vendors for migration roadmaps, testing timelines, upgrade plans, and information about cryptography embedded in products or services. Supplier readiness affects whether an organization can move its own systems safely.
- Plan phased implementation and testing. Coordinate changes across products, protocols, software, hardware, and services. Test interoperability and compatibility, and align cryptographic modernization with upgrades already scheduled where practical.
- Build crypto agility. Design systems so cryptographic algorithms can be updated without disrupting continued operation. NIST’s National Cybersecurity Center of Excellence project is demonstrating discovery and interoperability approaches; federal guidance also encourages automated inventory where appropriate.
Which post-quantum standards should organizations use?
NIST says three finalized post-quantum cryptography standards are ready to implement and advises organizations to begin applying them. Follow finalized standards and test them in the systems where they will be used; do not treat every proposed or experimental algorithm as having the same status.
In July 2026, NIST reported that a vulnerability discovery led to withdrawal of the HAWK signature algorithm, which had been under consideration. NIST said that development did not affect its finalized standards. The distinction matters: the withdrawal is not evidence that the finalized standards were affected.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What federal deadlines apply—and to whom?
Current federal requirements are not universal private-sector deadlines. The June 22, 2026 White House order sets dates for federal agencies to transition specified systems, while OMB Memorandum M-26-15 separately directs federal agencies to mitigate as much quantum risk as feasible by a stated date.
| Federal direction | Scope and date |
|---|---|
| White House order of June 22, 2026 | Federal agencies must transition high-value assets and high-impact systems to post-quantum cryptography for key establishment by December 31, 2030, and for digital signatures by December 31, 2031. |
| OMB Memorandum M-26-15 | Federal agencies are directed to mitigate as much quantum risk as feasible by December 31, 2030, using phased planning. |
Private organizations can use these federal actions as context for planning, but the cited dates do not establish a general compliance deadline for every business. Their own priority should reflect the confidentiality lifetime and impact of their data, their technology dependencies, and supplier readiness.
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