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One free scan finds every outdated or missing driver and matches the right update for your exact hardware.Free scan · exact hardware matchPolish prosecutors say the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau (CBA) never had complete control of the Pegasus surveillance system bought from NSO Group. Their forensic findings indicate that NSO retained technical access to material collected during operations, but investigators did not establish that the company actually opened files from any particular Polish surveillance case.
What Polish investigators found
Forensic experts from Poland’s Internal Security Agency (ABW) examined the Pegasus infrastructure used by the CBA. Their conclusion was that the Polish service did not possess full administrative or technical control of the system.
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The infection module stayed under NSO control
Prosecutors reported that the server module responsible for infecting mobile devices remained under the manufacturer’s exclusive control. The CBA also lacked passwords for some administrative accounts, while other components remained managed by NSO.
Data could leave Poland through NSO-managed infrastructure
Material collected from targeted phones was transmitted outside Polish territory through servers in different parts of the world and through a network managed by NSO. That architecture gave the manufacturer a technical path to the system and its traffic, even though it does not by itself prove that NSO staff read particular files.
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Technical access is not proof of viewing
The prosecutors’ wording is deliberately limited: NSO had “technical access to materials from operational surveillance.” Experts did not determine whether the company actually obtained materials from specific operations. The available findings therefore support a capability claim, not a finding that NSO definitely viewed the data of a named victim.
What Pegasus could collect from a phone
The capability description cited by prosecutors goes far beyond ordinary call interception. Pegasus could potentially harvest:
- Emails, instant messages and text messages
- Content from mobile and internet calls
- Browsing histories, calendars and contact lists
- Photos, videos and other files
- Location information
- Audio from the phone’s microphone and video from its cameras in real time
- Device screenshots
Those capabilities explain why courts authorizing surveillance needed a complete description of the system, rather than a general statement that it was a communications-monitoring tool.
How the Pegasus controversy unfolded
- 2017: Poland’s government under the Law and Justice (PiS) party purchased Pegasus from NSO Group.
- During the PiS period: The system was used against numerous targets, including political opponents, according to reporting about the investigations.
- December 2023: Donald Tusk’s coalition took power and began investigating how the former government acquired and used Pegasus.
- 12 October 2026: Notes from Poland published a detailed account of the prosecutors’ findings.
- 14 October 2026: The Record published the matching report about the manufacturer’s retained access.
What Donald Tusk has alleged
Prime Minister Donald Tusk called the affair “one of the biggest scandals in Polish history after the fall of communism.” He said the former authorities paid for a system that “de facto transferred all possible data on Polish citizens, Polish opposition leaders and Polish independent prosecutors…to the Israeli side.” Tusk also described the matter as a possible “crime against the state.”
Those statements are Tusk’s political characterizations. The forensic account establishes that NSO-controlled components and routes existed, but it does not establish cooperation with Israeli intelligence or prove that NSO itself accessed particular operation files.
What the evidence establishes—and what it does not
| Question | Established by the investigation | Not established by the cited findings |
|---|---|---|
| Could NSO reach the system technically? | Yes. NSO retained control of the infection server module, some components and parts of the network carrying data. | That NSO personnel opened or copied files from a specific surveillance operation. |
| Did the CBA control all of Pegasus? | No. It lacked some administrative passwords and did not control every system component. | That Polish operators had no ability to run surveillance; the finding concerns incomplete control of the overall infrastructure. |
| Could collected information leave Poland? | Yes. Data moved through servers in several parts of the world and an NSO-managed network. | How much data, if any, NSO actually retained or examined. |
| Were courts told everything about Pegasus? | A parliamentary commission reported that authorizing courts were not informed of the system’s full capabilities. | A final judicial finding that NSO accessed named victims’ files. |
Legal and oversight consequences
The reporting describes charges or other proceedings involving several former officials connected with Pegasus approvals, procurement or disclosure of surveillance material. A parliamentary commission also reported that the CBA had not obtained the required information-technology security accreditation.
The oversight findings raise a separate issue from the vendor-access question. Even if a court approved surveillance in an individual case, the commission said judges were not given a full account of Pegasus’s ability to capture files, location data, screenshots and live microphone or camera feeds. The cited reports do not establish final convictions or a final ruling that NSO itself accessed Polish operation files.
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Did NSO Group actually see Polish surveillance data?
The most accurate answer is: investigators say NSO had the technical ability to access material, but they did not determine that the company actually viewed data from particular operations. The distinction matters because a system can be designed and operated so that a vendor retains privileged access without producing evidence that employees used that access in every case—or in any identified case.
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For Poland, the unresolved question is therefore not whether the manufacturer could technically reach the infrastructure. The ABW examination says it could. The unresolved question is whether that capability was exercised against specific Polish targets and what records might prove or disprove it.
Why the finding matters beyond Pegasus
The case highlights a sovereignty and accountability problem in government spyware procurement. A state may pay for a surveillance platform and direct operations while still depending on a private manufacturer for core servers, credentials, updates or infection functions. If data routes through infrastructure outside the country, national agencies and courts may have less visibility into who can technically reach it.
That makes procurement terms, administrator control, security accreditation, logging and judicial disclosure central safeguards—not technical details that can be left out of an authorization request. Poland’s investigation is significant because it separates those control questions from the harder evidentiary question of whether a vendor actually read a particular victim’s data.
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