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What OT attacks can do to physical processes
Operational technology is the hardware and software used to monitor or control physical equipment and processes. Industrial control systems (ICS) are a common category of OT. A programmable logic controller (PLC) can control equipment; a human-machine interface (HMI) lets an operator view or interact with a process. These systems can be connected to business networks or remotely accessible, creating routes by which a cyber intrusion may reach industrial operations.
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That link between digital access and physical operations is what distinguishes OT risk from a data breach alone. A compromised system may let an intruder view or manipulate controls, interfere with monitoring, or affect the safe operation of a process. The actual outcome depends on the system, its configuration, the attacker’s access, and the safeguards and operator procedures in place. A capability to cause harm is not proof that harm occurred in a particular incident.
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What activity has been reported in U.S. critical infrastructure?
Government advisories describe targeting and compromise involving exposed industrial devices and weak security practices. Their accounts show that OT attacks are not merely hypothetical, while also distinguishing observed nuisance effects from potential physical consequences.
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- Internet-connected OT: A May 2025 fact sheet from CISA, the FBI, EPA, and DOE says agencies are aware of incidents affecting OT and ICS at U.S. critical-infrastructure entities. It urges operators to defend internet-connected OT and highlights public internet exposure and default or easily guessed passwords as risks.
- Small-scale systems: A May 2024 multi-agency fact sheet describes pro-Russia hacktivists targeting OT in water and wastewater, dams, energy, and food and agriculture in North America and Europe. The agencies characterize the activity as mostly limited to nuisance effects, while warning that techniques used could pose physical threats in insecure or misconfigured environments. The fact sheet discusses exposed remote access, outdated VNC software, and factory-default or weak passwords.
- PLCs in multiple sectors: A CISA, FBI, and NSA advisory, updated December 18, 2024, describes IRGC-affiliated actors exploiting PLCs, including at U.S. water and wastewater facilities. Its recommendations include checking for default or absent passwords, using strong unique passwords, implementing multifactor authentication (MFA), and addressing insecure internet-connected OT.
- Energy-sector campaigns: A 2022 CISA, FBI, and DOE advisory describes Russian state-sponsored campaigns against energy organizations from 2011 to 2018. It warns that disabling or inhibiting a process’s ability to fail safely could lead to physical consequences. That warning describes a risk, not a claim that every reported campaign caused physical damage.
Could an OT attack disrupt military operations?
It could interfere indirectly if it interrupts infrastructure services on which military operations rely. In a May 7, 2024 statement, the Department of Defense (DoD) identified energy, communications, transportation, water, and Defense Industrial Base services as critical infrastructure on which it depends to operate. A disruption to one of those services could create operational constraints; the degree of impact would depend on the affected service, location, duration, available alternatives, and the military’s ability to adapt.
DoD has also stated that the People’s Republic of China and Russia are targeting U.S. critical infrastructure to be positioned to disrupt society and interfere with DoD operations in a crisis. The 2023 DoD Cyber Strategy Summary similarly says that, in a crisis, adversaries “will seek to hinder U.S. military mobilization, sow chaos, and harm the American people.” These are official assessments of dependency and adversary intent. They are not evidence that a specific OT attack has already caused a U.S. military mission to fail.
The relationship is therefore a chain of risk rather than a demonstrated one-to-one outcome: cyber access may affect OT; an OT incident may interrupt or endanger a physical process; and a resulting disruption to a service could complicate military activity. The cited official sources do not quantify the probability or likely scale of that outcome, and they do not establish a particular U.S. military operation disrupted by an OT attack.
How access, consequences, and defenses fit together
| Part of the risk | What official advisories describe | What it does—and does not—show |
|---|---|---|
| Access path | Internet-exposed OT, weak or default credentials, outdated remote-access software, and exploited PLCs. | These are reported targeting methods or security weaknesses. Their presence can increase exposure; it does not by itself establish an operational impact. |
| Possible consequence | Nuisance manipulation, service interruption, or a potential physical threat in an insecure or misconfigured environment. | Reported nuisance effects and warnings about possible physical effects are distinct. A potential consequence should not be described as damage that occurred unless an advisory says it did. |
| Resilience measure | Reduce exposure, secure access, monitor systems, and prepare tested backups, response plans, and manual controls. | These actions reduce risk and support recovery; they cannot guarantee that an incident will not occur. |
What operators can do to reduce risk and preserve safe operations
Government guidance emphasizes both cybersecurity and the ability to keep essential processes safe and reliable during an incident. The right response depends on the facility and its safety procedures: disconnecting an OT network without assessing process safety could itself create hazards.
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Reduce opportunities for remote compromise
- Remove OT connections to the public internet when they are not necessary, as recommended in the May 2025 joint OT fact sheet.
- Replace default or easily guessed credentials with strong, unique passwords. Check PLCs for default or missing passwords.
- Use MFA where appropriate and manage remote access rather than leaving it broadly or unnecessarily exposed.
- Maintain an inventory of OT assets and assess vulnerabilities. For energy-sector systems, the 2022 advisory recommends risk-based patch management and testing patches outside production before deployment.
Plan for detection, isolation, and recovery
- Monitor OT activity and maintain logging so operators can identify suspicious access and support incident response.
- Identify dependencies between IT and OT before deciding whether or how to isolate systems. A February 2024 joint advisory on PRC state-sponsored activity recommends planning workarounds or manual controls that can support safe, reliable OT operation if isolation is needed.
- Back up OT systems and test recovery procedures regularly. The February 2024 advisory specifically recommends regularly tested OT backups.
- Exercise incident-response plans and test manual controls so staff know how to maintain critical functions if OT networks become unavailable. The 2022 energy-sector advisory also recommends regularly testing manual controls.
- Protect equipment physically as well as digitally; the 2022 energy-sector advisory includes physical security among its recommendations.
CISA’s October 2024 announcement of international Principles of Operational Technology Cybersecurity describes six principles intended to help organizations recognize how business decisions can adversely affect OT security and address risk while supporting business continuity. The practical aim is not simply to maximize isolation: it is to make informed security decisions without sacrificing safe operations.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What the evidence supports—and where it stops
Official U.S. sources support three conclusions: OT compromise can connect cyber access to physical processes; agencies have reported targeting and compromise of OT and ICS at critical-infrastructure entities; and DoD relies on critical infrastructure services that adversaries may seek to disrupt during a crisis. Together, these facts make interference with military operations a credible concern.
They do not establish that a particular OT attack has disrupted a specific U.S. military operation, nor do the cited sources provide a measured probability or scale for that outcome. Keep that distinction clear: documented activity, potential physical consequences, and strategic risk are related, but they are not interchangeable claims.
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