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What AI changes—and what it does not
AI can make familiar social-engineering attacks more convincing and easier to produce at scale. The FBI reported that criminals use generated text in social engineering, spear phishing, and financial fraud, and generated images in fictitious profiles, false documents, and impersonation schemes. In a May 2025 alert, the FBI described AI-generated voice messages used to impersonate senior U.S. officials and build rapport before seeking account access. These advisories document specific examples; they do not mean every synthetic image or voice is malicious, or that AI is necessary for an attack.
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The practical shift is to treat AI as an amplifier of phishing, impersonation, account compromise, and fraud. A polished message, familiar voice, or plausible video is not authorization. Controls should work regardless of how the content was made.
How to detect suspicious requests and activity
Look for unusual requests and broken process
Train employees, help-desk staff, finance teams, and executives to pause when a request asks them to disclose credentials or MFA codes, move a conversation to another platform, keep an action secret, or bypass normal approval. A new or slightly changed contact detail, unexpected urgency, or a request for money, access, or account changes should trigger verification. The FBI has warned about employee impersonation, help-desk manipulation, phishing, and attempts to obtain account access.
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Do not make grammar, spelling, polish, or an intuitive sense that something “looks fake” the main test. Those clues cannot establish who sent a request or whether the action is authorized.
Verify voice and video requests independently
Do not approve a payment, sensitive disclosure, access grant, or account change based on voice or video recognition alone. End the interaction and call the purported requester using a number from the organization’s directory or another independently trusted source—not a number or link supplied in the suspicious message. Apply a second-person approval for high-impact actions. The FBI’s guidance on impersonation campaigns likewise recommends obtaining a phone number independently and calling to verify the contact.
Monitor accounts and endpoints
Watch for unusual or privileged logins, repeated failed attempts, suspicious credential use, unexpected account-recovery activity, MFA changes, and endpoint alerts. The FBI recommends monitoring suspicious login attempts, including privileged logins. CISA identifies endpoint detection and response (EDR) as a useful security control in its guidance on AI-enabled phishing and social-engineering risks.
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Use email authentication for the problem it solves
Deploy and monitor DMARC, SPF, and DKIM to make it harder for attackers to spoof an organization’s email domain. External-email banners can also help staff recognize messages originating outside the organization. These measures do not prove that a message from a legitimate but compromised account is safe, so they must sit alongside identity verification and account monitoring.
Make reporting simple
Give staff a clear, fast way to report suspicious messages, calls, and requests to the security or abuse team. Preserve the original message and headers, URLs, timestamps, caller ID and callback details, screenshots, and relevant account or transaction information. Avoid casually forwarding suspicious links. The FBI recommends immediate reporting protocols, staff education using current examples, and monitoring for suspicious logins.
Controls that reduce exposure
Prioritize phishing-resistant authentication
CISA recommends phishing-resistant MFA, including FIDO authentication. Compared with authentication that relies on a code entered into a website, phishing-resistant methods are designed to resist credential capture through a fake sign-in page. They do not identify AI-generated content or prevent every kind of fraud. Check compatibility with the organization’s identity provider, plan enrollment for the workforce, and establish a secure account-recovery process before broad deployment.
Layer controls instead of seeking an AI detector
The official guidance cited here supports authentication, access control, email protections, endpoint monitoring, independent verification, and incident readiness. It does not establish a reliable general-purpose synthetic-media detector or a validated accuracy figure. A detector should not replace a trusted callback, a documented approval path, or the ability to contain a compromised account.
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Use the organization’s incident-response plan and adapt it to the incident. NIST SP 800-61 Rev. 3, finalized April 3, 2025, supersedes Rev. 2 and integrates incident response with broader cybersecurity risk management. Its model uses Govern, Identify, and Protect to support preparation; Detect, Respond, and Recover for incident response; and continuous improvement to incorporate lessons learned.
Quick Recap
- Report and triage. Route the report promptly to the security or abuse team. Preserve original messages and headers, URLs, call details, timestamps, screenshots, and affected account or transaction information. Do not circulate suspicious links casually.
- Verify through a trusted channel. Contact the purported person or organization using independently obtained contact information. For a sensitive transaction, use the established out-of-band approval process rather than accepting a new instruction at face value.
- Contain potential compromise. If credentials or codes may have been exposed, follow the account-compromise playbook. Using trusted channels, secure the account, revoke sessions or tokens where appropriate, reset credentials, review MFA and recovery settings, and block malicious infrastructure under the security team’s procedures. Escalate suspected endpoint or network compromise to incident responders.
- Assess the impact. Identify potentially affected people, identities, systems, data, funds, customers, and public channels. Preserve evidence and document decisions. Legal, contractual, regulatory, and law-enforcement reporting duties depend on the jurisdiction and incident facts; there is no single notification rule that applies to every case.
- Recover and communicate. Restore trusted access and monitor for follow-on activity. If the organization or its executives are being impersonated publicly, communicate through verified channels. The FBI advises victims to contact account providers promptly and report incidents to IC3; organizations should also follow their established internal and external reporting procedures.
- Improve the controls. Review how the request crossed safeguards, whether staff could report it quickly, and whether identity, email, endpoint, or approval controls need adjustment. NIST’s incident-response model treats lessons learned and continuous improvement as part of the process.
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