Water utilities face many of the same cyber threats as other critical-infrastructure operators, but a successful attack on water-sector operational technology (OT) can interfere with treatment and the production of clean, safe water. Water systems also rely on services such as electricity and communications, while homes, businesses, public facilities, and other infrastructure rely on water. The difference is not that water faces a wholly separate class of cyberattack; it is the combination of water-specific operational consequences and critical dependencies.
What could a cyberattack do to a water utility?
A cyber incident can affect a utility’s information technology (IT), its OT, or both. IT supports business and administrative functions; OT monitors or controls physical processes. EPA warns that an adversary who manipulates OT at a vulnerable drinking-water or wastewater system could disrupt production of clean and safe water. An incident may also interfere with operations and create significant response and recovery costs.
As an Amazon Associate I earn from qualifying purchases.
That is a potential consequence, not a claim that every intrusion compromises treatment or produces unsafe water. The effects depend on what systems are affected and how the utility responds. The operational stakes make it important to assess IT and OT together rather than treating cybersecurity as only a matter of protecting office computers.
Quick wins for a faster PC:
Fix the driver behind crashes, sound loss and screen glitchesFind Drivers →Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problemsFix Now →Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minuteDriver Scan →How does water compare with other critical infrastructure?
| Comparison | Water and wastewater systems | Other critical infrastructure |
|---|---|---|
| Consequence of OT compromise | Manipulation of OT could disrupt treatment operations and production of clean and safe water, according to EPA. | Each sector faces consequences tied to its own essential services; those effects are not interchangeable with water-service disruption. |
| Threat and equipment overlap | Water and wastewater facilities use industrial control equipment, including Unitronics Vision Series PLCs. | A joint government advisory reported that IRGC-affiliated actors using the CyberAv3ngers persona targeted those PLCs, which are also used in energy, food and beverage, transportation, and healthcare. |
| Dependencies | Water systems depend on services from other sectors, including electricity and communications. | Other infrastructure sectors also depend on one another; water itself supports public facilities, commercial buildings, and local economic activity. |
| Sector-level responsibility | EPA is the Sector Risk Management Agency for Water and Wastewater Systems. | DOE is responsible for Energy; HHS is responsible for Healthcare and Public Health. Each sector has a designated Sector Risk Management Agency. |
The Unitronics advisory demonstrates shared exposure to a particular type of OT equipment; it does not establish that water utilities are attacked more often or are more vulnerable overall. The government materials cited here do not provide comparable incident rates across sectors, so they cannot support a sector ranking.
Why do water-sector dependencies matter?
Water service depends on outside infrastructure, with electricity and communications among the broad dependencies CISA highlights. Disruption to those services can therefore affect a utility’s ability to operate or restore service. The dependency runs the other way too: water is fundamental to public facilities, commercial buildings, and local economic activity. A cyber incident affecting water can have consequences beyond the utility itself, while an outage elsewhere can complicate water operations and recovery.
This is why risk planning should consider more than the initial point of entry. Utilities need to account for which essential services they rely on, how an interruption could affect operations, and how they would respond if those dependencies were unavailable.
Which safeguards should water utilities prioritize?
A February 21, 2024 joint CISA, EPA, and FBI fact sheet identifies eight actions for water systems. It says they can be implemented concurrently:
Outdated Drivers Are Slowing You Down
One free scan finds every outdated or missing driver and matches the right update for your exact hardware.Free scan · exact hardware matchPC Slower Than It Used to Be?
A free scan shows the junk files, broken settings and background clutter dragging Windows down - then fixes them in one click.Free scan · Windows 10 & 11- Reduce exposure of systems to the public-facing internet.
- Conduct regular cybersecurity assessments.
- Change default passwords immediately.
- Inventory IT and OT assets.
- Develop and exercise incident-response and recovery plans.
- Back up IT and OT systems.
- Reduce exposure to vulnerabilities.
- Conduct cybersecurity awareness training.
The joint advisory about Unitronics PLCs adds concrete equipment-level guidance: remove insecure internet exposure from OT, implement multifactor authentication (MFA), use strong, unique passwords, and check PLCs for default or missing passwords. These measures address common routes to risk without implying that one device or control alone can secure an entire utility.
How should utilities keep risk assessments current?
EPA recommends that water and wastewater owners and operators, regardless of system type or population served, evaluate IT and OT risks and develop mitigation plans. Reassessment matters because networks, equipment, IT/OT use, standards, and threat information can change. A useful plan identifies vulnerabilities and specifies actions, needed resources, schedules, and responsibilities.
Response planning should be exercised, not left as a document. Include both incident response and recovery, and account for the electricity and communications services the utility depends on. Backups are one of the recommended safeguards, but recovery planning also needs to establish who will act and what resources and steps are required.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What guidance applies across sectors?
CISA’s Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals address common, high-impact threats with practices intended to be actionable and reasonably straightforward for smaller organizations. CISA also describes sector-specific goals as adding tailored requirements for selected sectors. For water utilities, that means using cross-sector practices as a baseline while accounting for water-specific operational risks and dependencies—not assuming water security is wholly separate from other infrastructure security.
Do these 3 things before closing this tab:
1Repair Windows errors before they cause bigger problems2Scan for outdated or missing drivers - takes under a minute3Clear out junk files and repair common Windows errorsQuick Recap
Best Value
Product prices and availability are accurate as of the date/time indicated and are subject to change. Any price and availability information displayed on Amazon at the time of purchase will apply.
