Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates invest in sport to make their countries more visible, build relationships with international organizations and businesses, attract visitors and support broader economic and domestic goals. They do it through major events, club and league investments, sponsorships and sovereign wealth funds. These are strategies and intended benefits—not proof that spending on sport reliably changes foreign public opinion.
What sports investment can do for a country
Soft power is influence gained through attraction, relationships and reputation rather than coercion. Sport can offer governments a route to that influence because major competitions draw global audiences and bring hosts into contact with governing bodies, teams, sponsors, media and visitors.
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The investment takes several forms, each with a different pathway to visibility or influence:
- Host events: A World Cup or recurring race puts the host country in the news and brings international visitors and organizations into its venues and cities.
- Buy or invest in clubs and competitions: Capital connected to a state can become part of familiar sports institutions with global audiences. Qatar Sports Investments (QSI) acquired Paris Saint-Germain in 2011; Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) acquired Newcastle United in 2021, according to SWP Berlin’s February 2026 analysis.
- Build leagues and recruit athletes: A stronger domestic competition can attract talent and audiences, create local activity and raise the country’s profile. SWP describes PIF as a major force in the expansion of Saudi football and the recruitment of international stars.
- Sponsor teams and events: Sponsorship associates a country-linked brand with recurring broadcasts and commercial networks. A 2024 article by Jonathan Grix and Paul Michael Brannagan discusses Qatar Airways’ prominent sports partnerships as part of broader sports diplomacy.
- Invest through funds: Sovereign wealth funds can place capital in sports properties and related businesses as one part of wider portfolios spanning fields such as media, culture, tourism and education.
The point is not that every investment is a diplomatic project or that commercial motives are absent. Sport can serve business, domestic policy, international relationships and image-making at the same time.
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How Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE differ
Their approaches overlap, but a 2022 comparative study by Vitas Rafael Carosella and later reporting identify different emphases. The table describes the actors, instruments and aims associated with each case; it does not rank their success or establish that stated goals have been achieved.
| Country | Actors and instruments | Stated or interpreted aims | Relevant qualification |
|---|---|---|---|
| Qatar | World Cup hosting; QSI’s investment in Paris Saint-Germain; Qatar Airways sports sponsorships. | Global visibility, tourism, international standing and diplomatic relationships. | Carosella’s study interprets football as one means of strengthening Qatar’s standing and helping protect its security amid regional disputes; that is an interpretation, not a measured result. |
| Saudi Arabia | Vision 2030 and PIF-linked expansion of football; Newcastle United; LIV Golf funding; Formula One and other events; pursuit of major competitions. | Economic diversification, tourism, jobs, domestic exercise and participation, and a larger international profile. | The strategy is highly visible and also draws criticism over human rights, workers’ conditions, free speech and environmental effects. |
| United Arab Emirates | Football investment and sovereign-fund portfolio investment, including Abu Dhabi’s Mubadala. | Support for the UAE’s positioning as an international travel and business hub. | SWP reports that Mubadala invested in TWG Global in 2025; the platform holds stakes in major US sports franchises and Chelsea FC. This is a portfolio-investment route, not evidence that Mubadala directly owns those teams. |
Qatar: events, clubs and sponsorship
Qatar hosted the men’s 2022 FIFA World Cup, a major event that brought the country repeated global exposure. Its sports strategy also extends beyond hosting: QSI’s 2011 acquisition of Paris Saint-Germain embedded Qatari capital in a prominent European club, while Qatar Airways has sponsored major sporting properties. Academic analyses connect these activities with tourism, showcasing leisure and cultural attractions, and Qatar’s international position.
That visibility has a contested side. Qatar’s World Cup drew criticism over the treatment of migrant workers and other rights concerns. The fact that a competition attracts attention does not establish that it improves how audiences view its host.
Saudi Arabia: Vision 2030 and a broad sports expansion
Saudi Arabia’s sports spending is closely associated in BBC Sport’s 2023 reporting and SWP Berlin’s 2026 analysis with Vision 2030 and PIF. Alongside acquiring Newcastle United and expanding domestic football, the country has funded LIV Golf and hosted Formula One and other events. FIFA selected Saudi Arabia to host the men’s 2034 World Cup, according to PwC Middle East’s 2025 sports outlook.
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Saudi officials have described sport as a way to encourage exercise among a young population, open the country to international visitors, grow tourism, create jobs and diversify beyond oil. BBC Sport reported in 2023 that the sports minister estimated investment at £5 billion over the preceding three years. That is the minister’s estimate as reported by the BBC, not an audited total or a directly comparable figure for the other states.
The portfolio can change. The Associated Press reported on 14 May 2026 that PIF became a FIFA World Cup tournament supporter and had announced it would stop future funding for LIV Golf. AP did not disclose the value of the World Cup partnership. These developments illustrate why individual funding arrangements should be dated rather than treated as permanent commitments.
UAE: investment alongside hub-building
Carosella’s 2022 study describes football investment as supporting the UAE’s ambition to become an international travel and business centre. The route is not limited to hosting or branding: SWP’s February 2026 account identifies Abu Dhabi-based Mubadala among the region’s prominent funds and reports its 2025 investment in TWG Global, a platform with stakes in major US sports franchises and Chelsea FC. That kind of investment can connect a fund to international sports assets while sitting within a wider portfolio strategy.
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Why spend at this scale?
Five aims help explain the logic without assuming that any one of them applies to every deal:
- Visibility and national image: Events and well-known teams can keep a country’s name in international coverage and commercial networks.
- Tourism and hospitality: Hosting can bring visitors and showcase destinations; officials may also hope that sports attention encourages future travel.
- Economic diversification: Sports businesses and related activity can form part of plans to develop sectors beyond hydrocarbons.
- Domestic participation and employment: Leagues, facilities and events can support local activity, jobs and opportunities to exercise.
- Diplomatic relevance and security: Repeated contact with sports bodies and commercial partners may create relationships; scholars also interpret some investments in light of regional competition and security concerns.
The goals may reinforce one another, but they are not interchangeable. A visitor count, a new job, a successful business investment and a shift in foreign public opinion would be different outcomes and require different evidence.
What the headline figures do—and do not—show
PwC Middle East’s Sports Industry Outlook 2025, published 9 April 2025, says Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds lead 24% of global sports investments. It also projects that Saudi Arabia’s sports market will grow from $8 billion to $22.4 billion by 2030. The latter is a forecast, not an observed 2030 result.
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PwC characterizes 50% of the GCC population as under 25, a demographic context relevant to official arguments about sports participation. Separately, SWP Berlin’s February 2026 analysis says the five funds it calls the “Oil Five” accounted for about 61%—approximately US$180.3 billion—of total investment volume among roughly 100 global sovereign wealth funds. That figure concerns those funds’ investment overall, not their sports spending.
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These measures indicate scale, market expectations or demographic context. None, on its own, demonstrates that an investment has improved a state’s reputation or increased its soft power.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.What critics mean by “sportswashing”
“Sportswashing” is a critical term for the argument that governments use sport to improve or normalize their image while diverting attention from human-rights or governance concerns. It is an accusation about purpose and effect, not a neutral label that proves why every investment was made.
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BBC Sport’s 2023 coverage records Saudi officials’ response: sports minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Turki Al Faisal called sportswashing claims “very shallow” and presented sports expansion as part of Vision 2030. The same reporting describes criticism involving human rights, migrant workers, free speech and environmental effects. BBC Sport also reported Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman saying, “If sportswashing is going to increase my GDP by 1%, then we’ll continue doing sportswashing.” The remark records his stated position; it does not verify a GDP effect.
Critics have also applied the term to Qatar’s World Cup, alongside concerns about migrant-worker treatment and rights. The relevant question is therefore not only who invested or hosted, but also which harms are alleged, what officials say in response and what independent evidence establishes. Commercial returns, domestic policy, diversification, diplomacy, regional competition and reputation can all be part of the picture.
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Hosting, ownership, sponsorship and fund investment create plausible channels for exposure and relationship-building. The cited studies and reporting describe aims and mechanisms, but they do not offer a comparable causal measure of how much those investments changed public opinion in Qatar, Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Exposure is not the same as attraction, and neither guarantees durable influence.
A sound comparison should distinguish announced intent from observed economic or participation outcomes, and both from a demonstrated change in international attitudes. Without a shared measure and evidence connecting investment to that change, it is not possible to rank these states’ soft-power returns confidently.
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