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AI is used in warfare in three distinct ways: autonomous weapons can select and engage targets after activation, decision-support systems can analyze information and recommend action to human commanders, and AI-enabled cyber capabilities can help identify or exploit vulnerabilities in digital systems. Existing international humanitarian law (IHL) applies to military uses of AI; the people using these systems remain responsible for meeting its requirements. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is also urging states to negotiate new binding rules for autonomous weapons, but that is a proposal, not an adopted treaty.
How is AI being used in warfare?
The label “military AI” covers different capabilities with different roles. A system that helps a commander assess information is not the same as a weapon that selects and engages a target, and neither is the same as software used to find weaknesses in computer networks. Keeping these categories separate makes it easier to understand both the risks and the rules being discussed.
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| Application | What it does | Central concern |
|---|---|---|
| Autonomous weapon system (AWS) | After activation, selects and engages targets without further human intervention. | Whether its effects can be anticipated and controlled, and whether its use can meet IHL requirements. |
| AI-based decision-support system (AI-DSS) | Processes information and offers recommendations to a human decision-maker. | Whether a person can assess the recommendation independently, with adequate context and time. |
| AI-enabled cyber capability | Helps identify or exploit vulnerabilities in digital systems. | Whether operations can be limited to military objectives without causing wider civilian disruption or escalation. |
What are autonomous weapons?
The ICRC’s March 2026 paper defines an autonomous weapon system by what the weapon does, not by whether it looks like a robot. In the ICRC’s view, it is a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further human intervention. It may respond to sensor information and a generalized target profile; the person activating it may not know the precise target, time or place of the resulting use of force.
That separation between activation and later engagement matters. If the effects of a system are difficult to predict or limit, users may struggle to assess whether a particular use complies with the rules governing attacks. The ICRC also identifies risks to civilians and combatants, escalation, and ethical concerns about delegating life-and-death decisions to machines.
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How does international law apply to AI in war?
AI does not create a legal vacuum. The ICRC says existing IHL applies to military uses of AI, including weapons and cyber operations in armed conflict. A weapon does not itself comply with IHL: people who develop, authorize and use it retain responsibilities for the decisions and actions within their roles. In particular, human users must meet the obligations that govern the conduct of hostilities.
The practical question is whether a system can be used in a way that allows those people to discharge their obligations. Relevant considerations include what the system can target, how predictable its effects are, where and for how long it operates, and whether its use can be limited to the circumstances for which it was assessed. The ICRC’s discussion of cyber operations likewise calls for states to develop a common understanding of how IHL applies to and restricts those operations.
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Can AI make military targeting decisions?
AI-DSS can help people analyze information, but a recommendation is not a substitute for a commander’s judgment. A human approval step alone does not ensure meaningful human decision-making: automation bias can lead a person to defer to a system, especially when its reasoning is opaque, its recommendations arrive quickly, or the decision-maker has little time to review them.
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The ICRC identifies several ways these systems can distort decisions:
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- Weak or context-insensitive data: Information may be incomplete or fail to reflect the circumstances in which a recommendation will be used.
- Opacity: A user may not be able to understand why the system produced a recommendation or judge its limits.
- Automation bias: People may give a system’s output more weight than their independent assessment warrants.
- Adversarial manipulation: An opponent may try to influence the information or system on which a recommendation depends.
- Fast propagation of error: A mistaken recommendation may spread through a process before people can recognize or correct it.
The ICRC says decision-support tools should support, rather than replace, human decision-making. Its 2026 FAQ refers to 16 preliminary recommendations for military decision-support systems, emphasizing human judgment and control.
How can cyber operations affect civilians during armed conflict?
AI-enabled cyber capabilities may help identify and exploit vulnerabilities in an adversary’s computer systems. But digital systems are interconnected: an operation aimed at a military target can have effects beyond that target. The ICRC warns that these capabilities can increase risks of indiscriminate attacks, incidental damage to civilian infrastructure and uncontrolled escalation in complex digital environments. These are risks, not inevitable results of every AI-enabled cyber operation.
In its 2025 working paper, the ICRC says state and non-state actors use cyber operations during armed conflict to disable civilian infrastructure and systems or disrupt essential services, particularly civilian government services. Disruption can therefore matter even when the immediate operation is digital: people may lose access to essential services or infrastructure on which they depend. The ICRC’s concern is that interconnected environments can make it difficult to foresee and contain knock-on effects.
What international approaches are being discussed?
NATO’s responsible-use principles and the ICRC’s proposed rules address different scopes and have different legal status. NATO’s principles are a political framework for defence AI, while the ICRC is calling for a new binding international instrument specifically addressing autonomous weapons. Neither should be mistaken for a treaty already binding on all states.
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| Approach | Status and scope | What it calls for or covers |
|---|---|---|
| NATO Principles of Responsible Use | Six principles in NATO’s 2021 AI strategy summary; apply across AI applications and their lifecycles. They do not supersede existing national or international obligations. | Lawfulness; responsibility and accountability; explainability and traceability; reliability; governability; and bias mitigation. NATO also calls for appropriate cyber defences, secure data infrastructure and protection against malicious uses of AI. |
| ICRC proposal on autonomous weapons | A recommendation for a legally binding international instrument; not an adopted instrument. | Prohibit autonomous weapons whose effects cannot be adequately predicted or controlled and those designed or used to target humans directly; restrict other autonomous weapons through limits on target types, geographic scope, duration, situations and scale of use. |
NATO’s current innovation information describes a Data and Artificial Intelligence Review Board as a focal point for responsible AI governance, alongside technology and defence innovation programmes. These are alliance arrangements and activities, not international legal rules that bind every state.
Is there an international treaty regulating autonomous weapons?
The ICRC’s March 2026 position calls for a new legally binding instrument, which means the proposed prohibitions and restrictions should not be described as existing treaty law. As of 5 October 2026, the ICRC identifies the Seventh Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), scheduled for 16–20 November 2026, as an opportunity for states to launch negotiations. Those dates describe a future meeting, not a completed negotiation or an agreed outcome.
The ICRC also points to UN General Assembly Resolution 79/239, adopted on 31 December 2024, and the UN Secretary-General’s report A/80/78, dated 5 June 2025, as steps in the wider military-AI debate. The positions of individual governments on the proposed treaty language are not established here, so the ICRC’s recommendation should not be presented as a settled international consensus.
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