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Western militaries are not shown to be the sole cause of Ukraine’s battlefield difficulties. But Al Jazeera’s October 1, 2026 report describes two obstacles that, experts argue, weaken Ukraine’s defence: delays to joint weapons production and slow adaptation of Western military institutions to lessons from the war. The report also points to funding uncertainty. These are attributed claims and examples, not a comprehensive audit of every project or a settled consensus about responsibility.
What the criticism is about
The cooperation model described by Al Jazeera is meant to benefit both sides. Western partners finance production facilities in Ukraine, while gaining access to Ukrainian battlefield testing and know-how. That exchange depends on more than investment: projects also need timely permits, workable rules for intellectual property and a route to export equipment or components where required.
The military-adaptation argument is related but distinct. Ukrainian forces have been iterating rapidly on first-person view (FPV) drones, adapting hardware and software to battlefield conditions, and using decentralised command. The experts interviewed by Al Jazeera argue that Western militaries have been slower to absorb those lessons into training, force structure and doctrine.
Neither argument establishes that Western institutions alone determine Ukraine’s battlefield performance. The reporting identifies frictions in cooperation and learning; it does not isolate their effect from other causes or measure how much territory or combat effectiveness they have cost.
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Why joint weapons projects can stall
Al Jazeera reports that a Kyiv School of Economics report, Beyond Aid: Making Ukraine Defence Cooperation Work, identified at least 180 Ukrainian-foreign business-to-business partnerships, of which 22 percent were stalled. Those figures are reported by Al Jazeera from the cited report; they should not be read as an independently verified count here or as a measure of all defence projects.
Permits and site decisions
One example in the Al Jazeera account is a planned Rheinmetall artillery-shell factory. Permits were delayed and the Ukrainian government moved the proposed site. The example illustrates how administrative decisions can hold up a facility even when foreign investment and a production plan exist. It does not establish that every delayed partnership faces the same problem.
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Intellectual property and fast iteration
Joint production raises questions about who owns or can use designs, software and modifications—especially when Ukrainian forces alter equipment in response to battlefield experience. Chris Pool, a visiting fellow at King’s College London’s Centre for Statecraft and National Security, said: “The process of registering intellectual property is lengthy,” adding that “Iteration cycles move so quickly, often what’s registered and protected is obsolete.” His point is that a process designed for slower development can struggle to keep pace with repeated changes to a system.
Export pathways
The report also identifies export mechanisms as a broader obstacle. A production partnership may need a clear route for equipment or components to move beyond the initial site or customer. The Al Jazeera account does not provide a project-by-project breakdown of which export rules apply, so the issue should be understood as a reported category of friction, not a finding that a particular rule blocked every partnership.
How Ukrainian battlefield lessons challenge military practice
FPV drones are one visible example of the pace of change. Al Jazeera reports that Ukraine produced one million in 2024, more than three million in 2025 and an estimated eight million in 2026. The 2026 figure is a forecast in the October 1 report, not a confirmed year-end total; the underlying production data were not independently checked for this account. Production counts indicate scale, but by themselves do not show how many systems reached units, how effectively they were used or what effect they had in combat.
Rapid changes in drones and their software create a practical challenge for organisations accustomed to longer procurement, testing and training cycles. Ukraine’s battlefield modifications can make an existing system more useful—or expose its limits—before formal acquisition processes have caught up. That creates pressure to learn quickly while still evaluating safety, reliability and the ability to produce and maintain equipment at scale.
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Decentralised command
Konstantinos Grivas, who teaches advanced weapons systems at the Hellenic Military Academy, singled out command structure: “The most important thing is decentralised command. Ukraine has implemented this more than anyone else.” The argument is that units need authority to act on local information when conditions shift quickly. That is an expert assessment, not proof that decentralisation works equally well in every force or situation.
Drones as part of the force
Oleksandr Danylyuk, a former senior adviser to Ukraine’s Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and a RUSI land-warfare expert, argued that Western forces remain behind in reorganising around drones. He said Western militaries have “not even started to shift all of the land forces units into drone infantry”. The phrase describes his criticism of the pace and scale of institutional change; it should not be taken as a literal claim that no Western unit uses drones.
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The wider lesson is not simply to buy more drones. Adapting can also require changes to training, command authority, tactics and the way forces assess systems that may be disrupted or unable to rely on GPS. The Al Jazeera report presents these as areas where Ukrainian experience could inform Western practice, while its interviewees judge that Western institutions have been slow to engage with those lessons.
Independent reader supportYour contribution helps us test, update, and keep practical guides available for everyone.Two bottleneck categories—and a separate funding constraint
| Area | What the reporting identifies | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Industrial and regulatory cooperation | Permit delays and site decisions; lengthy intellectual-property processes; export mechanisms. | These can slow the transition from a partnership or battlefield modification to sustained production and usable equipment. |
| Military adaptation | Slow engagement with FPV drone iteration, decentralised command and changes to force structure and training. | Institutions may take longer to turn battlefield lessons into doctrine and practice than the technology and tactics are changing. |
Funding is a related constraint, not a substitute explanation for either category. Al Jazeera reported that the United States had stopped funding “last year” and that the European Union was providing the bulk of aid “for now.” Those descriptions refer to the situation as portrayed in the October 1, 2026 article and may change; they are not timeless statements about current aid levels. The same report said $1 billion was invested in drone warfare in 2023, ten times 2022 spending. Al Jazeera does not identify the primary data publisher for that figure in the cited passage, so it is best treated as the article’s reported figure, not as a separately verified estimate.
How this fits earlier criticism of Western assistance
A 2024 RUSI commentary by Jahara Matisek, Will Reno and Anthony Tingle offers earlier context, rather than evidence of aid levels in 2026. The authors argued that bureaucracy, risk aversion and organisational resistance can make Western support lag battlefield needs. They wrote: “There is a tendency for Western assistance to reflect the war that Western policymakers and planners would prefer to fight, rather than the war Ukraine’s military is fighting.” They recommended more adaptive assistance, training and defensive resilience. These are the authors’ views; their commentary says it does not represent official Department of Defense, US government or RUSI positions.
Taken together, the two accounts describe a mismatch between the speed of battlefield change and the pace of administrative and institutional response. The 2024 commentary supplies a general argument about security assistance; the 2026 reporting adds examples about joint production and military adaptation. Neither, on its own, quantifies the overall effect of those problems on Ukraine’s defence.
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What the evidence does—and does not—show
- It shows reported friction: Al Jazeera’s account cites stalled partnerships, a delayed factory example, and expert concerns about intellectual property, exports and military adaptation.
- It includes attributed production estimates: the 2024 and 2025 FPV figures are reported totals, while the 2026 figure is an estimate, not a completed annual count.
- It does not establish sole responsibility: the article does not demonstrate that Western militaries alone are undermining Ukraine’s defence, nor does it quantify how much the named obstacles affect battlefield outcomes.
- It does not establish a complete project audit: the cited partnership figures and the Rheinmetall example cannot be generalized to every defence partnership or production facility.
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